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THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PUBLIC
SCHOOL PUPILS
RICHARD GYORY*
I.

INTRODUCTION

THERE

has been a rapid extension of the legal rights of minors in
recent years which is comparable, in many ways, to the earlier extensions of constitutional rights to black persons and women. As in each of
those cases, the new definition of constitutional rights reflects a pervasive
societal change. But as compared to the political upheaval which preceded
the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth amendments to the Constitution,
and the disciplined and persistent drive that resulted in the woman's right
to vote, the extension of constitutional rights to children has been largely
unorganized. Although legislation has played a part-most recently the
dramatic passage of the twenty-sixth amendment to the Constitution'judicial decisions have played the major role.
A large part of the redefinition of the rights of minors has taken place
in cases which arose as a result of the prohibition by public school officials
of certain student activities. - This was a logical progression from the
civil rights cases arising out of Brown v. Board of Education. However,
until recently, and in particular until Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District,4 the case law focused more on the racial conflict and the demand for equal education than it did on assertions of the
individual rights of students. Prior to the decision in Tinker, the attempts
to exercise protected constitutional rights (aside from efforts to obtain
equality) were found chiefly at the college level. The primary forum since
Tinker has been the high school.
There may be an objection to the statement that recent decisions have
effected an "extension of constitutional rights" to minors on the ground
that these rights have always existed. Those who make the objection may
* Member of the New York Bar. Mr. Gyory received his B.SS. from the College of the
City of New York and his LL.B. from Harvard University. He is a member of the firm of
Levin, Kreis, Ruskin & Gyory, New York City.
Mr. Gyory wishes to express his appreciation to his partners for their invaluable research
and drafting assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. The twenty-sixth amendment extends to citizens eighteen years of age or older the right
to vote. U.S. Const. amend. XXVI.
2. The constitutional rights of minors in juvenile delinquency proceedings have also undergone major redefinition in recent years. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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note that there was an actual extension of constitutional rights to Negroes
by virtue of the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, and to
women through the nineteenth amendment, but no such literal extension to
minors was made prior to 1971. This, however, is a very limited aspect
of what has occurred. Supreme Court decisions characteristically do not
state that new rights have been granted. On the contrary, aside from dissents, the Court usually declares that it is stating rights that were always
present. Such a bland characterization of the effect of decisions of the
Supreme Court may do for those constitutional opinions that do not
vary the pattern of law; it may also be true for cases where theretofore
untested matters are the subject of an opinion, especially if they reaffirm
situations that existed.5 But it is an unrealistic appraisal of those occasions where the Court's pronouncements have had the effect of rearranging established relationships as did the decision in Brown; indeed, one
has only to witness the tremendous amount of judicial activity that followed it. In a less dramatic way the impact of Tinker has been similar.
As originally drafted, the Constitution said little about individual
rights, expressing them only inferentially as limitations on the power of
the legislature.' The Bill of Rights did reserve rights to "the People" and
"Persons," but these did not cover many of what today are deemed to
be the important rights of participation in governmental activities. Citizenship was an obscure subject, occasionally mentioned in the Constitution, but remaining ill-defined.7 Clearly all citizens were not equal under
the Constitution;I but it is equally clear that constitutional rights were
never confined to citizens at any point in time.0
Reading the Constitution literally, it would be hard to argue by strict
construction that children are excluded from the rights of "Persons.""
5. E.g., Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874), where the Court held that
the Constitution did not give women the right to vote. The result was to leave things where
they had been before. No new legal or governmental pattern resulted.
6. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9.
7. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
8. For example, article I, section 2 provides that "No person" under twenty-five years of
age or less than "seven Years a Citizen," may be a congressman. Article I, section 3 provides
that "No Person" may be a Senator who is not thirty years of age and "nine Years a Citizen."
Under article II only a "natural born Citizen," or one at the time of the Constitution's adoption can become President.
9. However, at times the Supreme Court has come close to equating constitutional rights
with those of citizenship. See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), where the court stated:
"[W]e deal here with a constitutional right of the citizen . . . " Id. at 130. In that case the
right of foreign travel which by statute, involves the rights of citizenship, was at Issue.
10. See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511
(1969). Mr. Justice Stewart expressly limited the application of the rights although he concurred in the result. Id. at 514-15.
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The fact that little constitutional law regarding the rights of minors developed until the past few years is probably a reflection of the lack of a
broad movement among the population until the present time. Whatever
the reason for the delay of almost two centuries in passing upon the
rights involved, the Supreme Court, given the language of the Constitution,
had both a practical and constitutional mandate to pass upon the assertion
of constitutional rights made by or on behalf of minors." This article
is an attempt to assess the impact of the Supreme Court's decisions relating to the rights of public school pupils.

II. TBE CHILD

STEPS TO STAGE CENTER

The minor may still have to share his legal billing in the caption credits
with his parents, but there is no longer any question as to whom the star
is. He will generally sue in his own name through his guardian ad litem
to assert civil or property rights. However, in adjudicating those rights,
the focus is not on the parent, the taxpayer, or the state; it is on the
minor.'2
The emphasis on the welfare of the child was the basis of the decision
in Brown: "Does segregation .. .deprive the children of the minority
group of equal educational opportunities?"' 3 Probably no other judicial
decision has had a greater effect on American society. The drama of
Brown obscured the very important fact that it was a child oriented
opinion. Immediate attention was focused on the right to equal education,
which was not a new concept under the fourteenth amendment. But
characterizing the right as that of the child was novel. It remained, however, for Tinker to indicate the scope that the Supreme Court was to give
to this new measuring rod of constitutional rights.
There were earlier references to the rights of children in discussions
of constitutional questions, but the Court had been hesitant to state the
right as that of the child alone. For example, in Meyer v. Nebraska"
11. "The issue is fairly joined. It is precisely the kind of issue the Constitution contemplates
this Court must ultimately decide. This is true although neither affirmance nor reversal of any
of these cases follows automatically from the spare language of the First Amendment ... Y
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 662 (1971) (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in

part).
12. E.g., Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ariz.), appeal dismissed, 372 U.S. 228
(1963), where the court noted in a National Anthem case that the parents sued improperly in
a ciass action, but deemed them to be guardians ad litem, stating: "[T]he children will be
considered to be the plaintiffs, since they are the real parties in interest . . ." Id. at 767. In
New York the Commissioner of Education accepts appeals in the pupil's name. See, eg., In
re Bustin, No. 8257 (N.Y. Educ. Dep't, March 25, 1971).
13. 347 U.S. at 493.

14. 262 US. 390 (1923).
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a law prohibiting instruction in the German language was held "to interfere with the calling of modern language teachers, with the opportunities
of pupils to acquire knowledge, and with the power of parents to control
the education of their own [children].""; Mr. Justice McReynolds' decision in that case relied mainly on the parents' rights to engage teachers
in private schools. The reference to the rights of the child to an education
was not ready to stand alone. Two years later Mr. Justice McReynolds,
again speaking for the Court, held that a law prohibiting private sectarian
schools "unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians
to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control."' 1
Thus, while occasional mention was made of the right of the child to equal
"care, protection and training," the decisional law usually rested on
either the right of the parents
to train their children or the interest of
17
the state in educated citizens.
Although the tremendous impact of Brown in its substantive content
overshadowed the manner in which the Court reached its conclusion, i.e.,
in terms of the right of the pupil, Brown was not the first case to urge
students' rights. Earlier cases' involving state universities discussed such
rights; however, in each case the Court was dealing with adults who demanded equal opportunities for themselves through equal access to governmental offerings.
In Brown it was mentioned that society had an interest in equal opportunity in order that each pupil would be able to develop his intellect
to its maximum potential for the benefit of all. But this assumption underlies all of our rights; its reiteration in Brown was no longer a ground for
the result and appeared only as an explanation of the right. The assertion
of the minor pupil's right in Brown was a break with the past, thus representing a new emphasis-the pupil. It was many years before the implications of pupils' rights were to become evident. Not until Tinker could
the significance of this aspect be fully appreciated.
Tinker was the first unambiguous assertion by the Supreme Court of
the constitutional rights of school children. It was one of three notable
15. Id. at 401.
16. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). In Griswold v. Connccticut,
381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965), Mr. Justice Douglas characterized the decision in Pierce as permitting teachers to assert the rights of potential pupils.
17. "The prime object and fundamental principle of our free school system Is to educate
all citizens of the state to the end that they may become more efficient." Trustees of Graded
Free Colored Common Schools v. Trustees of Graded Free White Common Schools, 180 Ky.
574, 578, 203 S.W. 520, 522 (1918).
18. E.g., McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629 (1950) ; Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) ; Missouri ex rel. Gaines
v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
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decisions

9

by the Supreme Court within approximately one year dealing

with large areas of pre-college public education, thus indicating that the
Court's interest extended beyond equal rights. Indeed, the interest seemed
to extend to the entire process of public education.
Tinker was not without antecedents. Mr. Justice Fortas adduced those
earlier decisions of "almost 50 years"2 0 which referred to constitutional

rights in educational matters. But a reading of these cases does not disclose a single clear statement according the minor pupil constitutional
guarantees in the terms stated in Tinker: "It can hardly be argued that
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." 21 True, this was prefaced
by an important qualification that "First Amendment rights, applied in
light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students. 2 The important point is that the "rights,"
whatever may be their ultimate content, were recognized, thereby raising questions as to their extent with the attendant difficulties of definition.
Additional previous references to children's rights are found in decisions which denied the relief sought. In 1899, in Cumming v. Richmond
County Board of Education,23 the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice

Harlan, suggested:
If, in some appropriate proceeding instituted directly for that purpose, the plaintiffs
had sought to compel the Board of Education, out of the funds in its hands or under
its control, to establish and maintain a high school for colored children, and if it
appeared that the Board's refusal to maintain such a school was in fact an abuse of
its discretion and in hostility to the colored population because of their race, different
questions might have arisen in the state court.
... [A]ny interference on the part of Federal authority with the management of
such schools cannot be justified except in the case of a clear and unmistakable dis24
regard of rights secured by the supreme law of the land.

But unfortunately no such issue was presented. The Court's alacrity at
finding deficient pleadings continued to be equal to the acceptance of
racially separate schools. For example, in Gong Lum v. Rice,25 decided in
1927, Chief Justice Taft suggested:
Had the petition alleged specifically that there was no colored school in Martha Lum's
19. The other two cases were Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 US. 621 (1969)

(dealing with voters' rights in school affairs), and Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563
(1968) (dealing with teachers' rights).
20. See cases cited at 393 U.S. at 506-07.

21. Id. at 506. It is worth recalling that the application of first amendment rights to the
states and the schools is recent. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 US. 97, 105 (1968). See also
Denno, Mary Beth Tinker Takes the Constitution to School, 38 Fordham L. Rev. 35 (1969).
22. 393 U.S. at 506.
23. 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
24. Id. at 545.
25. 275 US. 78 (1927).
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neighborhood to which she could conveniently go, a different question would have
been presented, and this, without regard to the State Supreme Court's construction of
the State Constitution as limiting the white schools provided for the education of
children of the 26
white or Caucasian race. But we do not find the petition to present
such a situation.

It is doubtful that the unsuccessful petitioners were consoled by the
expression of a right in terms of Chinese children. The fact that children's
rights were expressed only in cases where the relief sought was denied
underlines the elusive nature of such constitutional guarantees in times
past. There is little in the decisions of the Supreme Court prior to Brown
which foreshadowed Tinker. Although Gong Lum is within the period
of "50 years" alluded to by Mr. Justice Fortas in Tinker,27 it understandably was not cited by him. Prior to 1954, the context in which the
Court dealt with educational matters was either the claims of adults to
equal access to higher education 2 or actions which mingled the rights
of parents and taxpayers.20

III. THE SUBSTANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
The racial struggle for integrated education preempted consideration

of the substantive rights of the pupils themselves. The movement, which
culminated in Brown, was one seeking equal rights, i.e., the equal right
to education, or the right to an equal education, insofar as the state maintained an educational system. The Court has not yet gone so far as to say
that education is a right in the sense that it is an obligation of the state to
make it available to all children.30 Chief Justice Warren expressly phrased
26. Id. at 84.
27. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
28. See cases cited at note 18 supra.
29. E.g., Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). An exception is Cochran v. Louisiana Bd. of Educ.,
281 U.S. 370, 375 (1930), where, although the Court noted a "public purpose" in giving texts
to students in non-public schools, it said: "The school children and the state alone are the
beneficiaries." This does not indicate a "right" of the children but it does indicate that they,
rather than their parents, are the ones to whom the state might look. The Court's emphasis
reverted again to the parents in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), when It dedared that the purpose of the disputed statute was "a general program to help parents get
their children ...

to ... schools." Id. at 18.

30. However, certain lower court decisions have stated that there is no such obligation.
E.g., Carter v. Hodges, 317 F. Supp. 89, 91 (W.D. Ark. 1970). But see Sims v. Colfax Community School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 485, 487 (S.D. Iowa 1970) ("It cannot be seriously disputed
that the interest of the State in maintaining an educational system is of such importance that
the State is in fact charged with the duty to further and protect the public school system.") ;
James v. Almond, 170 F. Supp. 331, 338 (E.D. Va.), appeal dismissed, 359 U.S. 1006
(1959) (schools may not be selectively dosed). Note that state constitutional provisions
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the question presented in Brown as one of depriving children of "equal
educational opportunities."3' The Court held that "[s] eparate educational
32
facilities are inherently unequal.1
The focus on equality of rights assumed that one group had more of
something which, for the good of others, it should share. 3 The benefit to be conferred by reason of enforcing the constitutional right was
achieved by comparing it with the benefit already enjoyed by others. This
did not involve a redefinition of the content of the rights. The comparative
simplicity of the measure avoided the more difficult questions of discussing constitutional rights in terms of pupils which arose once it was determined that the pupil possessed such rights. In order to ascertain the constitutional rights of the pupil, the pupil is now compared to adult citizens.
No longer is one pupil defined in terms of another. As each assertion of
a heretofore recognized right arises the question will be asked: How can
that right be exercised in the school setting? In time, the concept of rights
will itself probably be modified by the assertion of pupils' rights.
Constitutional "civil" rights were never sharply defined. As already
noted, the original document of 1787 devoted little space to such rights,
are often applicable, although the overriding effect of the federal law on basic rights leads to
their being but rarely cited today. Examples are found in the New York Constitution, mandating the legislature to provide "free common schools, wherein all the children of this state
may be educated." N.Y. Coast. art. XI, § 1; see Va. Const. art. IX, § 129. See also Ordway
v. Hargraves, 323 F. Supp. 1155, 1158 (D.Mass. 1971).
31. 347 U.S. at 493; see text accompanying note 13 supra.
32. 347 U.S. at 495.
33. In the field of religion and education this assumption was traced to the Ordinance of
1787 which declared that "[rleligion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be
encouraged." Ordinance of 1787: The Northwest Territorial Government, art. fII, in U.S.C.
xxxix (1970). See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US. 390, 400 (1923). There was also an
unstated assumption that the mandate of equality would force the "haves" to share their benefits rather than deny themselves. This appears, in general, to be the enforcement technique in
the desegregation area where the process has gone forward, albeit with more deliberation than
speed. That the assumption may not always be reliable is emphasized in the recent "swimming pool case," Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). In 1899 Mr. Justice Harlan rejected such an argument to achieve equality: "But if that were done, the result would only
be to take from white children educational privileges enjoyed by them, without giving to
colored children additional opportunities for the education furnished in high schools. The
colored school children of the county would not be advanced in the matter of their education by a decree compelling the defendant Board to cease giving support to a high school for
white children." Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 US. 528, 544 (1899).
Apparently Mr. Justice Harlan felt that there was less danger of stopping the railroads I
"Our Constitution is color-blind .... The law regards man as man, and takes no account of
his surroundings or of his -color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of
the land are involved." Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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expressing them as limitations on the legislative power.8 4 The Bill of
Rights, although devoted entirely to the subject of personal rights, continued the negative method of phraseology. Thus, the first ten amendments are essentially prohibitions. As with the Biblical commandments,
the ideals of our society must be inferred from the statements of proscribed activity. The ringing phrases of the Declaration of Independence
-"Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness"--were partially restated
in the preamble: "Justice . . . domestic Tranquility ...the general Welfare . . . the Blessings of Liberty." But once past these introductory
phrases, the draftsmen of the Constitution depended on the common law
to supply the substance of the personal rights of the inhabitants of the
land.
The Supreme Court has been similarly loath to enter into general descriptions of substantive rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Characteristically, the early cases concerning civil liberties dealt with property
or commercial rights. 5 It was not until the close of the nineteenth century that the "business" rights, i.e., the right to pursue a livelihood, moved
seriously into the realm of what is thought of today as civil rights." An
early dictum is found in a case involving the right to sell commercial
insurance:
The liberty mentioned in that amendment means not only the right of the citizen
to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the
term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all
his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he
will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation,
and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and7
essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.

Another example is found in Meyer:
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed,
the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been
definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint
but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally
to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men. 8
34. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9.
35. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), and cases cited therein. In
Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870), the Court approved movement from
state to state "for lawful commerce" as one of the "privileges and immunities."
36. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (ordinance prohibiting operation of a
Chinese laundry held invalid).
37. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
38. 262 U.S. at 399.
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This is a well-rounded statement, if somewhat more attuned to the livelihood and morals of mankind than to his pleasures. Usually the Court has
been content to arrive at a description of the basic rights and privileges
by an accretion of opinions based upon specific examples. Slowly, and not
always consistently, a path is traced between permissible and prohibited
activities. From the accumulation of decisions an outline of the right is
drawn. This method has the advantage that the rule thus arrived at is a
more practical working tool for the lawyer than are generalized descriptions of rights. The latter are more likely to be certain in appearance,
but difficult to apply.
The case-by-case process of the common law has the virtue of adaptability. Societal changes cause developments that are difficult to foresee.
Nevertheless, the question of whether the activities conducted in the new
setting are constitutionally protected or not must be resolved. The societal
changes may be so marked as to virtually bring about new activities. Thus
the media of radio and television have profoundly affected the activities
covered by the first amendment. The process of adjusting the new means
of communication and the older concepts of freedom is illustrative of the
type of adaptation involved in interpreting the Constitution. The substance of the rights is not constant. Both social changes and physical
changes of an industrial or scientific nature produce alterations which
are translated into new activities and new rules.
The recent developments in constitutional law with respect to students'
rights come at the same time as a worldwide movement toward youthful
participation in the governing process and the other societal structures
which influence our lives. The state and federal legislation of the past
few years extending the vote to eighteen-year olds,. 9 culminating in the
twenty-sixth amendment, is illustrative. It is safe to assume that the continuation of this phenomenon will have its impact upon the present-day
concepts of constitutional rights, and that its early results will be found
in the old molds. Terms such as "freedom of speech," "freedom of the
press," and "due process" do not have the same content today as they
did one hundred years ago, but they continue to furnish the broad outline which encompasses most of the civil rights cases. Within these
categories fall the recent developments which are considered in this
article.40
39. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 6, 84 Stat. 318 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973bb-1973bb-1 (1970)).
40. Consideration of one significant right that the court has developed is deferred, namely,
"bodily freedom," which does not neatly fit into any specific category and yet has special
significance in an area almost co-equal with compulsory education. See part MI E infra.
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A. The Tinker Case
The Tinkers were an Iowa family with strong beliefs concerning
American participation in the war in Vietnam. The Tinker children attended public schools in Des Moines. Upon learning that a group of
adults and their children had intended to wear black armbands during
the Christmas holiday season, the Des Moines school officials adopted a
regulation prohibiting the wearing of any armbands in the schools. As
a result of the refusal of the Tinker children to obey the regulations,
the principals of the schools involved suspended them. Subsequently, the
Tinkers commenced an action in the federal district court for an injunction which was denied following an evidentiary hearing.4 ' The ruling was
sustained without opinion by an equally divided court of appeals sitting
en banc.4" The Supreme Court granted certiorari4 3 and reversed.4 ',
The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Fortas, held that the wearing
of black armbands to symbolize a political grievance was close to "pure
speech" and therefore was within the protection of the first amendment.
The opinion strongly emphasized the facts of the case, noting the lack
of danger or disruption to the school system. The majority implied that
there was nothing in their opinion which had not "been the unmistakable
' 4
holding of this Court for almost 50 years. 1 1
One must look at the concurring and dissenting opinions to ascertain
the true significance of Tinker. The breadth of the decision was emphasized by Mr. Justice Harlan's brief dissent, which would scarcely have
been necessary if the pronouncement had been merely a reiteration of
earlier decisions: "I certainly agree that state public school authorities
in the discharge of their responsibilities are not wholly exempt from the
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment respecting the freedoms of
expression and association."" A stronger indication of the sweep of the
decision occurred in the opening remarks in the concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Stewart: "Although I agree with much of what is said in the
Court's opinion, and with its judgment in this case, I cannot share the
Court's uncritical assumption that, school discipline aside, the First
'47
Amendment rights of children are co-extensive with those of adults.
41. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D.
Iowa 1966), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967), rev'd,
393 U.S. 503 (1969).

42.
1967)
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.
(per curiam), rev'd, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 390 U.S. 942 (1968).
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Id. at 506.
Id. at 526.
Id. at 514-15.
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The view attributing the most far-reaching significance to Tinker was
found in the unusually caustic dissent of Mr. Justice Black: "The Court's
holding in this case ushers in what I deem to be an entirely new era in
which the power to control pupils by the elected 'officials of state supported public schools .. .' in the United States is in ultimate effect transferred to the Supreme Court. ' 48 This opening volley was followed by a
remark that implied that the Court had granted the petitioner's claim
that pupils from kindergarten through high school were free to express
political views in school. Justice Black claimed that the question was
"whether students and teachers may use the schools at their whim as a
platform for the exercise of free speech .. .49 adding that he had "never
believed that any person has a right to give speeches or engage in demonstrations where he pleases and when he pleases."5s° But one might note
that many of Justice Black's earlier pronouncements on constitutional
rights had asserted their "absoluteness," and tended in the very direction he later disclaimed. 51 It is this absolutist quality accorded to constitutional rights which makes Justice Black's position in Tinker readily
understandable. His fear in the past had been that attempts to limit free
speech were frequently veiled efforts to deny its exercise under the guise
of protecting the rights of others. The fear, of course, was that such an
approach would make the first amendment a fiction rather than a reality,
i.e., that, in effect, only approved expressions in a narrow area would be
allowed, thus stifling the free airing of information and ideas. Mr. Justice
Black was as zealous as any in this view. It therefore becomes a difficult
task for one adhering to the absolutist view to accept a situation hedged
about with qualifications.
Although Justice Black's dissent might have been understandable in
the terms stated above, he did not so state them. However, his fear seemed
to be that the majority thought in such terms, for he stated:
And I repeat that if the time has come when pupils of state-supported schools,
kindergartens, grammar schools, or high schools, can defy and flout orders of school
officials to keep their minds on their own schoolwork, it is the beginning of a new
revolutionary era of permissiveness in this country fostered by the judiciary.52
48. Id. at 515 (footnote omitted).
49. Id. at 517.
50. Id.
51. E.g., Adamson v. California, 332 US. 46, 90 (1947) (Black, 3., dissenting): 'itis an
illusory apprehension that literal application of some or all of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights to the States would unwisely increase the sum total of the powers of this Court to
invalidate state legislation.'
52. 393 U.S. at 518. The next step Mr. Justice Black foresaw in the list of evils "would
be to hold unconstitutional laws that bar pupils under 21 or 18 from voting... ." Id. Congress and the Court were not long in reaching the subject. Voting Rights Act Amendments

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

Did the Court's opinion herald an era of student rebellion? Did it purport
in broad terms to grant unfettered liberties to children where previously
the courts had been willing to defer to school officialdom in perhaps an
even greater measure than to the legislative and executive branches of
government?
It is submitted that aside from the general ambiance of the opinion,
which certainly is libertarian, the holding is not necessarily broad. Indeed, were it not for the remarks of the dissenters, the decision might
have been read as indicating little new in the annals of constitutional law.
The caution of the early statements made by Mr. Justice Fortas seemed
to extract much of what the decision is reputed to confer: "First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment, are available to teachers and students. 53 Because this pronouncement is so ambiguous it is not very useful in assessing the rights
of the individual or the rules of conduct which might guide school boards
and school staffs; nor is it helpful as a guide to pupils. It is of little value
to say that there is a general right which is specially limited in the school
environment. The earlier expression might have been that the right of free
speech, at least to the extent which it is found elsewhere, does not extend
to the school situation. The majority might well claim that it stated little
new in its holding on the issue of free speech. That, however, does not
tell the whole story.
More important than the tribute to stare decisis is the extreme emphasis of the Court on the factual situation. This emphasis provides some
insight into the intent of the Tinker majority. Clearly the Court was concerned with evidence of a "mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint;" 4 in particular, the subject of Vietnam. The opinion observed that the authorities
had singled out "the silent symbol of armbands, of opposition to this
Nation's part in the conflagration in Vietnam,""5 while at the same time
the school administration did not prohibit "buttons relating to national
political campaigns, and some even wore the Iron Cross, traditionally a
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 6, 84 Stat. 318 (codified at 42 U.S.C., §§ 1973bb-1973bb-1
(1970)). This legislation having been held ineffective as to state and local elections in
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), Congress proceeded to approve the resolution
(S.J. Res. 7, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 Cong. Rec. 2886 (1971); H.R.J. Res. 223, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess., 117 Cong. Rec. 1856 (1971)), which, with unusual rapidity, became the twentysixth amendment to the Constitution in July 1971.
53. 393 U.S. at 506.

54. Id. at 509.
55.

Id. at 510 (footnote omitted).
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symbol of Nazism."5 6 Although the subsequent remarks of Mr. Justice
Fortas struck at "enclaves of totalitarianism" attempting to confine expression to sentiments "officially approved," 7T it is clear that the lack of an
evenhanded approach by the school authorities was a significantly prejudicial factor against their case.
The Court also placed heavy reliance upon a record which "[did] not
demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have led school authorities
to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school
activities, and no disturbances or disorders on the school premises in fact
occurred."5 8 This conclusion was flatly contradicted by Justice Black."
The differences in emphasis by the two judges would have sufficed to
explain their different results, even had neither expressed a difference as
to the legal or constitutional principle. Indeed, it is this very emphasis
which beclouds the significance of the decision. For if some see it as the
bold (or horrendous) pronouncement of a new era in the American public school system, others wonder whether its future may not be closer to
the fate of the Dartmouth College case, 60 somewhat long on pontification,
but of little practical consequence. It is suggested that neither view is
appropriate.
In the three years that have elapsed since Tinker was decided, the decision has figured in a remarkable number of cases on either side of the
proposition of students' rights. The frequency of citation for a restrictive
position vis-h-vis the pupil might lead one to wonder "what all the shouting was about" so far as the dissents were concerned. Clearly its initial
56. Id. Not of Nazism, but of German imperialism.
57. Id. at 511.
58. Id. at 514.
59. Id. at 517-18 (dissenting opinion). Mr. Justice Fortas began the majority opinion
with a recitation of the ages of petitioners as sixteen, fifteen, and thirteen years old. Id. at
504. Mr. Justice Black listed the pupils' ages as eight, eleven, thirteen and fifteen. Id. at
516. Contrasted to the majority's recitation of the "silent, passive 'witness of the armbands"' which "neither interrupted school activities nor sought to intrude in the school
affairs or the lives of others," and only caused some "discussion outside of the classrooms"
(id. at 514), justice Black's dissent noted: "[A] warning [was made] by an older football
player that other, nonprotesting students had better let them alone . . . [and] a teacher of
mathematics had his lesson period practically 'wrecked' . . . by . .. Mary Beth Tinker, who
wore her armband for her 'demonstration,' . . . that this armband did divert students'
minds from their regular lessons . . . and diverted them to thoughts about the highly
emotional subject of the Vietnam war." Id. at 517-18.
60. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 US. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). In
that case the Supreme Court held that an amendment by the state of the college's charter
would destroy a contract. Thereafter the states were careful to insert the necessary reservations in their corporation statutes.
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impact has not been to unleash the "new revolutionary era of permissiveness""' feared by Justice Black. Nevertheless, Tinker is far from
devoid of importance.
Tinker, although providing little guidance in particular circumstances,
is significant as an expression of judicial concern extending to areas theretofore regarded as better left outside the legal process.0 2 Considered with
Pickering v. Board of Education, 3 and Puentes v. Board of Education,4
it is clear notice that educational endeavors are no longer beyond the
judicial pale. In this respect, the significance of Tinker is not unlike that
of Baker v. Carr,65 which gave notice that the Court was ready to look
into elective processes, and Gideon v. Wainwright,", in which the Court
indicated judicial scrutiny was to be applied to implement a fair trial.
The language by which the Court announced that the student has constitutional rights both inside" and outside" the classroom signifies a new
term of reference for measuring the rights to be defined. It no longer
suffices that the student be treated equally to other students; adult rights
appear to be the new measure, albeit, perhaps, one that may vary.
Significantly, as a result of the Tinker decision the federal courts are
today an active forum in which the educational system is scrutinized and
the merits of constitutional rights asserted by public school pupils are
reviewed. While this has been indicated in integration and equality
claims, no broad interest had previously been expressed in the terms used
in Tinker and Pickering. The knowledge that a new concern had been
expressed, that judicial review in terms of constitutional rights may be
available, must have an impact upon the operation of schools, even as
it has had an impact on elections and courts, although the results are not
likely to be as immediate as in those fields. The impact may be ascribed
either to an attitude of "Big Brother May be Watching" or "Someone Up
There Will Listen" depending upon one's point of view. Attention is at
61. 393 U.S. at 518.
62. Recent decisions may portend a narrowing of the scope of judicial review of school
matters at least in the federal courts. See Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 259 (10th Cir.
1971) ; Farrell v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 1971) ; Mailloux v. Kiley, 436 F.2d 565, 566
(1st Cir. 1971). See also Jackson v. Hepinstall, 328 F. Supp. 1104, 1107-08 (NID.N.Y. 1971).
63. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
64. 392 U.S. 653 (1968). In this case a teacher was held to have been insubordinate for refusing to answer an administrator's investigative questions following the teacher's circulation
of a letter critical of the school. In a per curiam decision citing Pickering, the Court remanded
the case to the New York Court of Appeals, which reversed its earlier decision. Puentes v.
Board of Educ., 24 N.Y.2d 996, 250 N.E.2d 232, 302 N.Y.S.2d 824 (1969).
65. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
66. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
67. 393 U.S. at 506.
68. Id. at 512-13.
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this point directed to specific categories of rights in order to see how the
adjustments have been effected since Tinker was decided by the Supreme
Court.
B. Freedom of Speech
The free speech issue was the basis for Tinker and Pickering.It therefore enjoys a peculiar primacy in the list of rights accorded to public
school pupils. 9 The right to express political views has impeccable credentials in the history of civil rights. Although extending the right to
school children may have been novel, there clearly was nothing new in
stating that the expression of criticism of governmental policy was constitutionally protected. The issues presently posed are: (1) What does
"free speech" mean as applied to pupils in school?, and (2) What are
"the special characteristics of the school environment" that limit the
activity?
In considering the school setting, there are the normal problems presented by aggregations of people which require some regulation if each
person is to be allowed the optimum exercise of his own rights. Primarily
the school is a place for learning; hence, those rules which are necessary
to permit the educational task to be performed must be maintained. But
what "those rules" are may run the gamut from the scholastic to the
open schoolroom approach. A further consideration is the age factor.
Generally, the age of the children involved ranges from five to eighteen
years old, and in many schools the overlap of ages may run from three
to nine years. Obviously, the questions of diverse abilities, physical
attributes, comprehension, and maturity compound the difficulties. 70 While
Tinker did not, at least in the majority opinion, address itself to these
questions, it did not exclude their consideration. What Tinker did say
was that the difficulties that inhere in the school environment are not a
ground for arbitrary and repressive solutions. Mr. Justice Fortas stressed
that "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough
to overcome the right to freedom of expression." 71 The board of education "must be able to show that its action was caused by something
more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort ... [of] an unpopular
viewpoint."72 Certainly where there is no finding and no showing that
69. Tinker specifically mentioned both teachers' and pupils' rights. Id. at 506. Both Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 US. 563 (1968), and Puentes v. Board of Educ., 392 US. 653
(1968), were decided during the same term.
70. "Moreover, the general age level of the student group involved might affect determination of the constitutional issue. A 'demonstration' in kindergarten, after all, is not the same
as one in college." Farrell v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160, 162-63 (2d Cir. 1971).
71. 393 U.S. at 508.
72. Id. at 509.
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engagement in the forbidden conduct would "'materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline .. .' " the
prohibition cannot be sustained.7 3 Similar strands are found in Mr. Justice Marshall's opinion in Pickering with respect to teachers:
Thus no question of maintaining either discipline by immediate superiors or harmony
among coworkers is presented here ...
. .. The Board's original charges included allegations that the publication of the
letter damaged the professional reputations of the Board and the superintendent and
would foment controversy and conflict among the Board, teachers, administrators,
However, no evidence to support these allegations
and the residents of the district.
74
was introduced at the hearing.

Neither case sounds, upon reading these phrases, like a ringing declaration of a new era of freedom. Indeed, one might read their end result to
be an insistence on greater procedural precision in hearings, rather than
a remarkable step in defining the scope of free speech. Such insistence,
of course, is not without an indirect effect on speech since its operative
effect would be to make school officials a bit more hesitant to summarily
mete out punishment or to see emergencies or potential harm to others.
The evidence to sustain that position would have to be presented with
care and detail, and possibly be subjected to appellate review. But one
must probe deeper to arrive at the new outline-if it is new-of free
speech inside the school.
Tinker suggests that for pupils and teachers the rights are to be
"applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment . . . .,,' However, as to teachers, "the State has interests as an
employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differs significantly
from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the
citizenry in general." 76 Clearly then, the Court distinguished degrees of
exercising the right, or to phrase it otherwise, a differing right depending
upon where the speech is made. It therefore seems odd to find the Court
referring to Terminiello v. Chicago,77 as authority for the statement:
"Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that
deviates from the views of another person may start an argument
73. Id.
74. 391 U.S. at 570.
75. 393 U.S. at 506.
76. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). It is assumed that this refers to
the rights of the board regarding teachers while they are actually teaching as compared to

teachers outside their teaching function.
77. 337 US. 1 (1949), cited in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). See Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 809 n.6 (2d Cir.
1971).
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or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this
risk .... 778
Terminiello exemplified the very situation which, it is believed, the
Court will not permit to develop as a part of the right of free speech in
the schools. Terminielio involved a political speech in a turbulent rockthrowing setting, where the free use of radical epithets and "fighting
words" figured prominently. Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court
in a 5-4 decision, said the conviction was void because of a charge which
too broadly defined a breach of the peace as "'misbehavior which violates
the public peace and decorum'. .

. ."7

In dissent, Mr. Justice Jackson

referred to the " 'surging, howling mob hurling epithets,' " to violence, to
thrown objects, and to police unable to control the mob.80 Against this
background Terminiello delivered a vituperative speech. The "[e] vidence
showed that it stirred the audience . . . to expressions of immediate

anger, unrest and alarm.""' Mr. Justice Douglas, however, observed that
"a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite
dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or
82 even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging.
It seems highly unlikely that the leeway suggested by the Court in
Tinker implies anything approaching the Ternminiello situation, hedged
in as the Tinker holding is by references to lack of disruption of either
work or discipline in that case. Broad proscriptions of political topics are
no longer permissible. The excuse that they are applied to all persons, or
all such topics, is insufficient to justify such regulations. The Court stated
in Tinker that "a regulation . .. adopted by school officials forbidding

discussion of the Vietnam conflict, or the expression by any student of
opposition to it anywhere on school property except as part of a prescribed classroom exercise ... would violate the constitutional rights of
students, at least if it could not be justified by a showing... [of danger
to] work and discipline .... 8"Even a limited regulation prohibiting discussion of disturbing issues absent a demonstrable danger is not tenable
under the Tinker decision. The showing of danger will need some substantiality; it will need more than an "undifferentiated fear." ' The school
officials must be ready with facts sufficient to "reasonably . . . fore78.
79.

393 U.S. at 508.
337 US. at 3.

80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 16.
Id. at 22 (dissenting opinion).
Id. at 4.
393 U.S. at 513.

84. Id. at 508.
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cast substantial disruption of or material interference with school
activities .

..."85

If the quoted rule for limits of school regulation of political discussion is not a precise guide, the difficulty is not new. The implementation
of "a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil '8 0 has from
its inception been attended by difficulty. The decisions which honored
the "clear and present danger" rule in the breach indicate the tenuous
nature of the rule, if not the difficulty of its application."1 It is true that
the Court has come to administer the rule with greater stringency, but
the practical problems of recognizing when the threshold of violence has
been reached in any given situation, or of knowing the nature of "the
substantive evil" of forcible political threats,"" consign the rule to uncertain application. It is therefore not surprising that the Court's recent
decisions did not suggest the limits of freedom of discussion within the
schools; indeed, it is not even settled outside.
Whether the clear and present danger rule, which was not adverted to
in either Tinker or Pickering,s9 has much scope in the school setting is
questionable. One might say that the rule is the same but the danger of
harm or violence in a school setting is much greater due to the exposure
of young children and their lack of discretion or control. Hence, the
need to regulate the apprehended danger is apparent as a result of the
nature of the school environment. Although logically plausible, it is hard
to see what practical value is left to the rule by such reasoning, for this
approach could justify almost any degree of regulation.
The difficulty of the narrow line that the school administrator must
tread is emphasized by the recent holding of the Appellate Division of
the Supreme Court of New York in Oliver v. Donovan,9 ° indicating that
there is a right on the part of parents to insist upon protection for their
children if it can be established that the board or administration has been
85. Id. at 514.
86. Terminielo v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
87. E.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616
(1919). See generally Z. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States (1941).
88. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1949), where Mr. Justice Jackson,
dissenting, suggested, by reference to Mein Kampf, that doctrines of force pose problems that,
if not removing the efficacy of the clear and present danger rule, at least call for the invocation of apprehended danger at a much earlier stage than the Court on that occasion felt appropriate. In a partial concurrence and partial dissent one judge asked: "Can it be said that it
is common sense to force the university to walk the tight rope of 'imminent danger' for
the sake of rhetorically extending logic to its breaking point?" Kom v. Elkins, 317 F. Supp.
138, 145 (D. Md. 1970).
89. In Pickering the possibility of violence was not suggested.
90. 32 App. Div. 2d 1036, 303 N.Y.S.2d 779 (2d Dep't 1969).
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inadequately attentive to the matter. There certainly is nothing shocking
in the assertion, but it does highlight the problem of the beleaguered
school official who may well feel "damned if he does, and damned if he
does not" act in a particular way at a moment of apparent crisis.
Whether violence is to be the touchstone of free speech is doubtful.
For while it may well be a test, in and of itself it is hardly the only
danger to be apprehended. Would a school administrator be expected
to tolerate the Terminiello speech, which included the following remarks:
"Jews, niggers and Catholics would have to be gotten rid of," "Kill the
Jews," and "Dirty kikes"? 91 Name calling and racial epithets are, in the
school setting, dangers which summon upon the likelihood of immediate
physical violence for which little practical protection can be administered.
But that is not to say that this justifies broad prohibitions which in effect
could foreclose legitimate discussion. However, it does suggest that certain limitations which might not be permissible in adult debate may be
imposed by school authorities.
Racial epithets may of themselves be sufficiently destructive, even
where there is no doubt that physical harm will not result. It does not
seem conceptually difficult to hold that psychological harm may befall
a child subjected to overt racial prejudice in the form of verbal abuse.
Some might regard this as a short step from damage due to intangible
factors of which the Court spoke in Brown.12 The duty of a school system may be similar for psychological as well as physical protection. In
this regard, the question may be one of balancing conflicting rights. It is
suggested that as far as ethnic epithets or fighting words are concerned,
the Court might be more receptive to curbs on discussions than in other
areas.
Obscene language is an area which seems more likely than racial or
religious epithets to be an early testing ground. Reported lower court
decisions 9 3 which are likely to find their way upward for appellate review in the near future indicate that the judicial temperament in response
to public use of "dirty words" is very close to that accorded ethnic epithets
and fighting words. A rationale for prohibiting such speech can be spelled
out in terms of educational responsibility for the "moral" development
91. 337 U.S. at 22 (dissenting opinion).
92. 347 U.S. at 493-94. The suggested limitations may themselves be limited; thus, the
constitutional limitations regarding religion may be a curb on the extent to which one can
travel to avoid hurt feelings. Cf. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
93. E.g., Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ.,307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1969); Schwartz

v. Schuker, 298 F. Supp. 238 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). Baker distinguished between "obscenity" and
"vulgarity," stating that the latter was not protected, but the Supreme Court appears to have
reached the opposite conclusion in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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of pupils. 94 There might also be the argument of protection, although it
appears to dangerously extend the utility of this approach. It may be
asserted that foul language is itself a breach of discipline, that by statute
school children have the duty to be "orderly," 5 and that the very act of
swearing or using obscene terms is an act of disorderliness. Of course,
if the constitutional right of free speech is held to include the right to
use such words, then the incursion of the statute does not of itself authorize a school prohibition.
0 the district court went
In Baker v. Downey City Board of Education,"
beyond the state statutes with respect to discipline. Quoting from Burnside v. Byars,97 Judge Crary emphasized the interest of the state in maintaining an educational system which in turn requires rules and regulations
and the maintenance of discipline in which "'school officials have a wide
latitude of discretion.' "I9 The Baker case is notable in that the court
appeared to make a double resolution with respect to profanity in (1)
equating vulgar language to indiscipline and (2) holding that the administration was "reasonable" in suspending students for such behavior.
Baker did not involve oral speech, i.e., actual discussion, but involved
a school newspaper printed and distributed outside the school. It therefore
94. Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517, 520 n.2 (C.D. Cal. 1969),
was expressly based, in part, on the California Educational Code prohibiting "willful disobedience, habitual profanity or vulgarity" (Cal. Educ. Code § 10602 (West 1969)), and the
Administrative Code which requires the exercise of "moral supervision." (Cal. Admin. Code
tit. 5, §§ 301 & 5530 (1969)).
95. See N.Y. Educ. Law § 3210(1) (a) (McKinney 1970). See also Baker v. Downey
City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517, 524 (C.D. Cal. 1969), citing, inter alia, Cal. Educ. Code
§ 10609 (West 1969), which requires the pupil to comply with regulations and to "submit
to the authority of the teachers of the schools." In another age it was simpler:
A child should always say what's true
And speak when he is spoken to,
And behave mannerly at table:
At least as far as he is able.
R.L. Stevenson, Whole Duty of Children, in Collected Poems of R.L. Stevenson 363 (1950).
96. 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
97. 363 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1966).
98. 307 F. Supp. at 521. The citation of Burnside has apparently received additional Impetus from its appearance in Tinker. See 393 U.S. at 513. Burnside was an appropriate pre.
cursor for Tinker. High school pupils wore "freedom" buttons and "One Man One Vote"
buttons which the principal thought would cause "commotion." Upon their refusal to remove
the buttons the children were suspended for a week. The district court upheld the principal;
the court of appeals reversed on the basis of the first amendment. On the same day, the
same panel of the same court, again speaking through Judge Gewin, held valid a regulation
preventing the wearing of the same buttons where the "activity created a state of confusion,
disrupted class instruction, and resulted in a general breakdown of orderly discipline . ..
Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 751 (5th Cir. 1966).
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presented a factual situation distinguishable from the physical speech
situations considered thus far in this article-a situation perhaps less
compelling of support in favor of school authorities since the impact of
the written word is less likely to be attended by immediate physical harm
or violence." So far as the decision may be tested under the Tinker
rationale, it is submitted that the result will turn on the scope the Supreme
Court may be expected to give to vulgar language in general. The idea
of obscenity has varied to such a degree within the past decade that it
is a slippery topic with which to grapple. A respected libertarian only
a generation ago assumed that a "total prohibition of previous restraint"
was not a defensible position, citing as an apparently self-evident example
of its indefensibility that "[i]t would forbid the removal of an indecent
poster from a billboard."1 0 There are two elements in the changes which
have occurred. The first is our social acceptance of a new norm which
allows much that previously would have been classified as indecent. 101
The other element has been the holdings of appellate courts, which have
severely limited the extent to which administrative bodies may censor
expression.
A judicial response to the obscenity problem sharply at variance to
that evinced by Judge Crary in Baker was that of Judge Thornton in
Vought v. Van Buren Public Schools, 0 2- who declared: "[T]hat area of
the law today is about as well-defined as the course of a tornado."' 0 3 Although it noted that the school's regulation governing obscene material
on school grounds was a reasonable measure, the court did not, in the
initial proceeding, reach the question of free speech because of the expulsion of the student without any hearing. The court issued a restraining
order directing the school board to hold a hearing on the question of
expulsion. In the quoted transcript of the school hearing held pursuant
to the district court's order, the student's lawyer compiled evidence to
show that the school's reading materials included words which were
deemed more offensive than those which were the basis for the pupil's
99. Baker is considered further in the succeeding section on school publications. See notes
135-38 infra and accompanying text.
100. Z. Chafee, supra note 87, at 10.
101. "We can all agree that the free speech clauses do not wipe out the common law as
to obscenity, profanity, and defamation of individuals." Id. at 14. Are we ready to agree
about that today? The basis for Chafee's approach was explained by profanity and indecent
pictures "having slight expository value in the exposition of ideas." Id. at 150. Today the
"art form" may fill in where politics leaves off. See Korn v. Elkins, 317 F. Supp. 138 (D. Md.

1970).
102.
103.

306 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
Id. at 1396.
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expulsion. 10 4

This led Judge Thornton to ask: "And if the student is invited and/or required to read the latter two, what can the school authorities have in mind in expelling him for possession of the former?"' 10 Accordingly, the court termed the board's position "preposterous."' 0 0
Judge Thornton rendered his decision in Vought on the basis of due
process rather than free speech, declining, as he stated, to become involved in a discussion of obscenity. Undoubtedly there are those whose
logic suggests that this rationale would indicate removing from the
school library and deleting from the teacher's reading list any required
reading found to be more offensive than that for which expulsions are
ordered. There may also be those who find in this an example of overreaction by the administrator, where the end result appears to have
opened wider the door he harshly sought to close. 10 7 It should be noted
that Judge Thornton did not limit the right of the school to regulate
obscene materials, but indicated that when disciplinary measures are to
be imposed there must be some proportion between the offense and the
penalty.
After making allowances for the changes in the judicial approach to
obscenity, one may question whether the changes to date have made any
notable incursions into the right of local legislative bodies to regulate
obscene language where neither art nor religion are concerned. This may
leave a question, as Justice Holmes once observed, as to the wisdom of
particular attempts to control obscenity, but it would appear that constitutionally the means are still available. 08 A fortiori the ability of the
state or the local board to regulate obscene language remains. 0 9
A-

104. The offending words were found in J.D.'Salinger, The Catcher in the Rye (1951), and
Harper's, April, 1969, both of which contained "certain four-letter words."
105. 306 F. Supp. at 1395-96. For a similar rationale applied to the classroom teacher, see
Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 362 (1st Cir. 1969); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp.
352, 357-58 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
106. 306 F. Supp. at 1396.
107. The allegations of the complaint were that the principal grabbed the papers in
question, struck the student, informed the parents there would be a hearing for expulsion on
the basis of the one incident (the possessory facts being unclear), then summarily informed
the parents that the board had expelled the boy, without a hearing, based on the principal's
statements. In the words of the court, "the drastic action of expulsion for such [a] single
incident, carrying as it does a lifetime stigma, is hardly punishment fitting the crime." Id.
108. Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915).
109. To the extent that the words "profanity," "cursing," or "swearing" may involve
"sacrilege" there is the possibility of transgressing the religious strictures of the first amendment. Otherwise the Court's statement in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), appears
to control: "We hold that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech
or press." Id. at 485. A divided Court reaffirmed Roth in United States v. Thirty-Seven (37)
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971), and United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971). Mr. Jus-
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The free speech issue is likely to be posed often in terms of the right
"peaceably to assemble, and to petition the ... [school administration]
for a redress of grievances.""' The school authorities form an obvious
target for students; it is not surprising to find that student criticism elicits
the prompt defensive response that school discipline is threatened. However, if as a practical matter one may expect to find that the most probable
exercise of free speech is in this area, one may also expect that the Tinker
rationale would apply. Tinker prohibits limiting free speech to classroom
hours; specifically enumerated places where the right may be exercised
are in "the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the
authorized hours. .. ."1" Thus, while suggesting that limitations may be
placed upon the time and place of exercising their rights, the Court clearly
indicated that the students' rights included student criticism of the school
112
staff.
Probably the most difficult aspect of dealing with elementary and
secondary schools is the wide range of ages among the pupils. Thus, a
student entering kindergarten is usually five years old, whereas a student
about to be graduated from high school is likely to be seventeen or
eighteen years old, or even older as a result of delays or postgraduate
education. 1- Accordingly, the rough and tumble of free debate on
emotion-laden issues indicates some need for protection in such a setting
beyond that afforded at adult levels. The strong expression of views by
older pupils may take on a coercive appearance which could distort free expression into veiled aggression. The exposition of views within the school
grounds is not the same as their presentation outside. In his concurring
opinion in Tinker, Justice Stewart, quoting from Ginsberg v. New
York," 4 cautioned: "'a child-like someone in a captive audience-is not
possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees.' """
tice Harlan implied in Reidel that there was little question of a permissible state interest to
protect children against obscenity. Id. at 358 (concurring opinion). Query whether the difficulty at the high school level runs more in the direction of vulgarity than obscenity? If such
is the case, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), may pose some interesting questions.

110. U.S. Const. amend. I.
111.
112.

393 U.S. at 512-13.
Id. Cited with approval was a decision involving a college demonstration which

led to the suspension of several students. The court there held that peaceful assembly to
object to school practices could not be prohibited. Hammond v. South Carolina State College,
272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967).
113. Also, with the expansion of public school nursery programs, the age may be declining at the lower end of the spectrum. See Farrell v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160, 162-63 (2d Cir.
1971).
114. 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968).

115. 393 U.S. at 515. The possibility of coercive student activities figured strongly in Katz
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The danger of coercion may also proceed from innocent expressions ox
those in authority. For example, the exercise of the right of staff members to express their views in the school or classroom can create an
opportunity to overbear. What, for example, is the reaction of the young
pupil upon seeing teachers and administrators wearing political buttons?
Might it not be argued persuasively that the child is more likely than
the adult to crave acceptance, to seek approval, and to conform? Certainly where the Establishment displays its views-the school staff is
Establishment to the pupils-it may have an effect upon pupils out of
proportion to that which is expected in the usual open exchange of ideas.
The same principle may be applied to upperclassmen with respect to
those in the lower grades, although the degree of impact might be different. Clearly, the extension of Tinker into the school environment must
be a gradual experimental process. It must not be supposed that it is easy
to be free." 6 This is no less true in schools.
It is suggested that future regulations of free speech in elementary and
secondary schools will not lend themselves to any one formula. Rather,
they will probably evolve from a case-by-case consideration of the demonstrated dangers and the bona fides of the schools in meeting their problems. In this regard the knowledge which the judges possess as members
of the community may be determinative of their acceptance of a given
topic as the subject of public talk. Thus, an attempt by school officials to
prohibit a theological issue might be more sympathetically received by a
court than the exclusion of an economic subject. But assuming that a reasonably apprehended danger of violence could be shown, evidence of a
practical alternative means of permitting the discussion may well be part
of the necessary proof by the school whose authority is questioned.
An effort to furnish guidance in the area of the student press is found
in a recent case decided by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In
Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education,"" high school students desired to
publish their own newspaper without having to comply with the school's
requirement that distributable written material be submitted to the
school administration for approval prior to distribution. The students
contended that the regulation hindered free speech, but the court felt
that it was designed to maintain the orderly operation of the school, 18
although it was unclear on the procedures to be followed once the written
v. McAulay, 438 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1971), petition for cert. filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3558 (U.S. June
14, 1971) (No. 1817, 1970 Term; renumbered No. 70-272, 1971 Term).
116. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Richard Rush, Oct. 20, 1820, in XV The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 283 (P. Ford ed. 1904).
117. 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971).
118. Id. at 807.
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material was submitted. Judge Kaufman invoked the instructions of the
Supreme Court in Freedman v. Maryland"9 regarding censorship obliga
tions. The emphasis, insofar as it related to prior restraint, was on deai
submission procedures, coupled with prompt review and decision. In this
the court of appeals differed from the lower court, although affirming the
result. In the district court Judge Zampano had ruled that there could be
no prior restraint. 20 Mindful of the danger of a "chill on first amendment activity," the appellate court specified that the standards which
constitute "distribution" must require "substantiality," and that the restrictive action, if any, must itself be strictly limited both as to the type
of material which might be put in question, and as to the situation (danger, disruption or damage) that might permit such action."
The Eisner opinion is typical of the attempts made by the courts to give
guidance in this troubled and difficult area. It, as well as the other "school
cases," is not in keeping with the traditional judicial approach of merely
disposing of the matter before it. This is because the bench seems more
than ordinarily troubled about the inferences that may be drawn in these
cases. Thus, the opinions rendered are longer and possibly more expository than other cases involving civil rights. In Eisner, the court was
hopeful that its guidance might have the effect of returning "decisions
with respect to the operation of local schools ... [to] local officials."' 2
To this end judge Kaufman called upon the school board to provide specificity in its regulations as to the conduct which might be subjected to
censorship, and at the same time to indicate the appropriate areas-both
in terms of subject and geography-for distribution of the student
press.123 Expressly within the area not requiring toleration by school
officials is racial or religious slander. Nor, apparently, is the subject of
obscenity, for which Ginsberg was cited. 2 4 This is in accord with the
rejection by the First Circuit of a teacher's right to exhibit in a school
corridor paintings which emphasized genitalia' 2 3 But the fact that these
119. 380 U.S. 51 (1965). Freedman held that the following procedural formalities must
be observed whenever a state requires the submission of a film to a censorship board for clearance before it may be shown to the public: (1) the censor has the burden of proving that
the film is unprotected expression; (2) any restraint prior to judicial review must be for the
shortest period compatible with sound judicial procedure; (3) a prompt final judicial determination of obscenity must be assured. Id. at 58-59.
120. Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 314 F. Supp. 832, 834 (D. Conn. 1970), afPd, 440
F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971).
121. "440 F.2d at 811.
122. Id. at 810.
123. Id. at 809-11.
124. Id. at 809 n.6.
125. Close v. Lederle, 424 F.2d 988 (1st Cir. 1970) (en banc), cert, denied, 400 US. 903

(1971).
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are areas in which the school officials may exercise their discretionary
functions will not justify blanket prohibitions. A sense of humor might
26
help.
C. Freedom of the Press
In the past the school's interest in newspapers probably resulted as
much from fear of liability as from fear of ideas, or "wrong" ideas at
least. Whereas the oral remarks of the pupils on campus were unlikely to
carry beyond the school grounds, the possibility existed that the school
newspaper might. It was objective evidence of school activities; it was an
example which could subject the school officials to citizen judgment.
Therefore, the newspaper formed a basis of concern for the school staff.
Whatever else may have concerned school officials in the past, it does
not appear to have been freedom of the press. 127 In light of Tinker, this
indifference is no longer tenable.
Although several cases involving school newspapers were decided prior
to Tinker, the number of recent opinions indicates that this is an area
in which a rapid development leading to definitive guide lines may be
expected. Among the cases decided subsequent to Tinker, Zucker v.
Panitz28 fired a broadside at attempts to narrowly define the educational
aspects of the school newspaper. In that case, a group of high school
students sought to place an anti-Vietnam war advertisement in the school
paper. The student editor approved the proposal, but the school principal
disapproved it, directing that it not be published. When the students,
through their parents, sought a declaratory judgment, the school authorities argued that the paper was primarily an exercise for the student
staff, and that school policy limited both news and editorials to school
activities. Judge Metzner, in reply to the first argument, scoffed at the
educational value of a journal of such limited substance: If the news126. See Scovlle v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970) (en banc), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 826 (1971), rev'g 286 F. Supp. 988 (NJ). II. 1968), where the court said: "Finally,
there is the 'Grass High' random statement, 'Oral sex may prevent tooth decay.'" Id. at 14.
This attempt to amuse comes as a shock to an older generation. But today's high school students are not insulated from the shocking but legally accepted language used by demonstrators
and protestors in streets and on campuses and by authors of best-selling modern literature. A
hearing might even disclose that high school libraries contain literature which would lead students to believe the statement made in "Grass High" was unobjectionable.
In New York, the Commissioner of Education held that there was no evidence to support
the contentions of a particular board of education that a female swimming teacher wearing
a bikini disrupted the discipline of the junior high school boys she taught. In re Martin, 10
N.Y. Educ. Dep't Rep. No. 8156 (1970). Indeed, maybe attendance and interest improvedl
127. Z. Chafee, supra note 87. Chafee's book does not contain any references to students'
rights, much less free press.
128. 299 F. Supp. 102, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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paper's contents "were truly as flaccid as the defendants' argument implies, it would indeed be a sterile publication."'1 The court then observed
that the newspaper did in fact contain controversial topics, and added
that this was a part of teaching journalism.
The school authorities asserted, based on Tinker, that adults could not
insist on placing advertisements in commercial newspapers; hence, students could not have greater rights inside the school. Judge Metzner replied that since the school provided the medium it could not, especially
as a governmental organ, refuse advertisements for its "administrative
convenience."' 13 Furthermore, the opinion stated: "The rationale of
Tinker carries beyond the facts in that case."' 31 Referring to the statement in Tinker that free speech is not confined to the classroom, Judge
Metzner stated: " 'intercommunication among the students ...

is . . .

an importantpart of the educational process.' ,,132 The reliance on Tinker
by the Zucker court appeared to be sound, especially since, as Judge
Metzner noted, the Court in Tinker had pointedly referred to the chilling
effect of the school principal's decision on the school newspaper. M Accordingly, Judge Metzner stated:
This lawsuit arises at a time when many in the educational community oppose the
tactics of the young in securing a political voice. It would be both incongruous and
dangerous for this court to hold that students who wish to express their views on
matters intimately related to them, through traditionally accepted nondisruptive
modes of communication, may be precluded from doing so by that came adult community.'3

What is the student's alternative to access to the school newspaper?
Possibly Judge Metzner felt overt acts are the danger that might arise,
thus turning on the Establishment the very argument that it has used,
and, if it can be demonstrated by proof, the principal remaining defense
to justify school regulation of free press. The "safety valve" argument,
or the therapeutic value of a Hyde Park discussion area, is not new.
Implicit in Judge Metzner's opinion was his belief that the danger of disruption caused by the refusal to tolerate an organ for the dissemination
of ideas carried as much force as the dangers that might be caused by
allowing such a publication. It is not necessary to push the argument
beyond this point. However, there are those who argue for greater Jib129. Id. at 103.
130. Id. at 104 (citation omitted).
131. Id. at 105.
132. Id., quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 US.
503, 512 (1969).
133. 299 F. Supp. at 105 n.6.
134. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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erality by stressing the apparent lack of persuasiveness of the media in
changing political opinions, of religious tracts in converting, of erotic
art in seducing, or of movie or television violence in depraving. One
likes to think that some achievements in art and literature, e.g., the Bible,
the Declaration of Independence, Shakespeare, have had some effect on
humankind for the better; it would seem to follow that their converse
would also have an impact, presumably for the worse. It is not necessary
to reach into the vagaries of these contentions, important as they may be.
It is in terms of immediacy that the argument against censorship finds its
justification, and this indeed is the very basis of the "clear and present
danger" rule. If another is wanted, the difficulty of administering any
standard of remote danger provides an effective reinforcement.
Zucker dealt with a school supported newspaper. The alternate means
of written expression, namely the student's "private" or "underground"
newspaper has generated at least as much controversy. The distribution of
nonapproved or unofficial publications either on or off campus has met
with sharp administrative resistance. For example, in Baker v. Downey
3 5 the students went off campus to produce a
City Board of Education,'
newspaper which the court found was common, vulgar and profane.18 0
Aside from the vulgarity exception which was discussed earlier, 37 the
case merits consideration because of the assertion of control of off campus
activities by school authorities. In Baker the court specifically denied
that political views or criticism of the school staff formed the basis for
either the disciplinary action of the school authorities or the decision.'
As a practical matter, if the on campus facilities are denied to the
students, the chances are that there will be off campus publications, less
likely to be subject to either scrutiny or control by school administrators.
This may be a consideration addressed more to the wisdom of regulation
than to its legality or constitutionality. However, drawing the line on permissible publication or distribution itself involves free speech, free press
and due process. It may be unrealistic to expect that the judicial reviewer
of fact will sharply separate the technical legal limits of school authority
from the reasonableness of the regulations subjected to court review,
assuming they are separable elements.
In Schwartz v. Schuker131 the court upheld the suspension of a pupil
135. 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1969). Baker was discussed earlier in this article In the
context of freedom of speech. See text accompanying notes 96-101 supra.

136. The court enshrined in the Federal Supplement for posterity a copy of the newspaper in issue. See 307 F. Supp. at 528-33.
137. See notes 93-109 supra and accompanying text.
138. 307 F. Supp. at 527.
139. 298 F. Supp. 238 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
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who, after a warning, distributed on school grounds a non-school paper
which "contained four-letter words, filthy references, abusive and disgusting language and nihilistic propaganda."' 4 0 In addition, the paper attacked the school administration. The student refused to surrender copies
of the paper after being apprehended. Despite the suspension the student
attended class and was either to be graduated or transferred to another
school.
Judge Bartels noted the claim of first amendment protection and cited
Tinker for that proposition, but he observed that "it is far from clear ...
that [the plaintiff] was suspended because of protected activity under the
First Amendment rather than flagrant and defiant disobedience of the
school authorities."'' The opinion is not entirely clear on this point, for
the court then listed the breaches which seemed to include at least prima
facie possibly protected activities, i.e., bringing newspapers on to school
grounds when told not to do so, and refusing to surrender them on
request. The judge also stated that the boy appeared in school after
suspension "and admitted defiance of the superintendent's orders.""'
Possibly Judge Bartels felt the newspapers themselves contained constitutionally unprotected obscenities. He implied that distribution off campus
might be legal," thus indicating that the breach of discipline consisted of
distribution in defiance of an order. But this of itself would not seem,
under Tinker reasoning, to justify the school's action unless the court was
ready to rest on the content of the newspapers, i.e., the obscenities. There
was no discussion of violence or disruption caused by the distribution of
the papers, nor did the court appear to hold that the "nihilistic propaganda" constituted a basis for its exclusion. Explained in these terms it
would be consistent with Tinker, Baker, and even Zucker. However, as
written, the opinion appears to rely more on the "[g] ross disrespect and
contempt for the officials ....

"'4

Moreover, at least from the recitation

of facts, the punishment appears to have been meted out as much for
earlier misconduct as for later "misconduct" based on the disputed distribution and refusal to relinquish the newspapers. Since, however, the
court seemed to stop short of stating that the newspapers themselves
contained materials not protected by the first amendment, it seems not
to have given the constitutional assertion of privilege its full due. If
140. Id. at 240.
141. Id. at 241.
142. Id.
143. Id. "[Tlhe Court does not express an opinion that distribution of such an underground paper under those circumstances would or would not be immune from restraint under
the First Amendment." Id. at 241-42.
144. Id. at 242.
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the plaintiff was distributing a newspaper which the school had no right
to exclude, his actions would seem not, at least in a pejorative sense, to
have been defiant. In that event, the defiance of orders to cease distributing that which he may have had a right to distribute, the refusal to
surrender the papers, and the disobedience of the possibly improper
suspension would not seem to have been flagrant. The opinion is
therefore not satisfactory as an example of freedom of the press on school
property.
If the school administration in Schwartz was seeking a more moderate
solution to a particular situation, Scoville v. Board of Education45 is an
example of a harsher approach in what appeared to have been less turbulent surroundings, although in both cases the courts supported the
school authorities. It should also be noted that in Scoville the district
court decision, 4 " which was subsequently reversed, preceded the Supreme
Court's decision in Tinker and, indeed, to some extent relied upon Tinker
at the district court and court of appeals levels.
In Scoville two seventeen-year-old students distributed a mimeographed
"literary journal" to other students and faculty members. The paper included an editorial which criticized the administration in its communications with students, claiming that the purpose of the student paper was
"'the improvement of communication between parents and administration.' ,147 Then followed the sentence which the court found unprotected
by the first amendment:' 4 8 "'I urge all students in the future to either
refuse to accept or destroy upon acceptance all propaganda that Central's
administration publishes ....

,19

Three days after the distribution the students were prohibited from
taking final examinations; two days later, they were removed from the
debating team; yet another two days later, they were told that they
would be suspended for five days in the Spring, and several days later
their expulsion for the whole Spring term was recommended. All this occurred, apparently, without any hearingl
At a hearing which followed, to which the parents were invited but
did not attend, the board expelled the students on the basis of "inappropriate and indecent" language.5 0 The district court, however, did not rest
145. 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970) (en banc), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1971), rev'g 286
F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
146. Scoville v. Board of Educ., 286 F. Supp. 988 (NJ). II. 1968), rev'd en banc, 425
F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1971).
147. Id. at 989.
148. Id. at 993.
149. Id. at 989.
150. Id. at 993.

19711

RIGHTS OF PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS

its decision on this ground, but said that "where speech takes the form
of immediate incitement to disregard of legitimate administrative regulations necessary to orderly maintenance of a public high school system

. .."1'

it is not within the first amendment. Since no regulation was

mentioned in the decision, and this appeared to have been a single occurrence, it is difficult to see in this abstract statement a sufficient basis for
such a cavalier dismissal of the constitutional argument. Perhaps it may
be explained in terms of a pre-Tinker decision. Admittedly, the sentence
urging students to refuse " 'to accept or destroy upon acceptance all
propaganda that Central's administration publishes' ,12may cross the line
of acceptable statements, but it barely does so. This was not a covert
attempt to subvert, nor was it a conspiracy, or an "underground" newspaper. For all that appears, it was addressed as much to the Establishment as to the students, and the means were certainly at hand to respond
to the editors directly or in writing, as well as to present opposing views
to the student body. The reaction of the administration bespoke anger,
if not vengeance, and this may well have aided in the reversal.
The court of appeals held that the district court "made no meaningful
application of . ..the proper rule of balancing the private interests of

plaintiffs' free expression against the state's interest in furthering the
public school system." " 3 The court appeared to favor the acceptance
of "student criticism as a worthwhile influence in school administration."" It questioned both the wisdom and the efficacy of attempting to
stifle or chill "the production of well-trained intellects with constructive
critical stances .. ,," The court of appeals concluded that the criticism
was protected by the first amendment, and that the school officials failed
to show any danger flowing from the students' activities. The treatment
which had been meted out to the pupils is a further example of a situation
in which the penalty did not fit the crime. It illustrates the need that had
existed for Tinker. The injection of constitutional considerations into
everyday school affairs may have a salutary effect in dissuading those
who act with great power from acting precipitately. In the absence of
any disturbance, a warning against repetition of the particular overt request for action such as occurred in Scoville would seem to have met the
needs of the situation.
The school administrator's problems with respect to the students' .rights
vis-4-vis the printed word are complicated by the nature of the school's
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 992.
See text accompanying note 149 supra.
425 F.2d at 14 (citation omitted).
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id.
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affirmative duties. In one respect this problem is illustrated in Ginsberg v.
New York' 56 which held that the state has an interest and right to restrict
the distribution of obscene and pornographic literature to minors."" However, there are other dangers such as the liability of the school for the publication of a libel. Clearly, this is a risk for the school supported paper.
Since the editors are minors, there is a question as to whether they are subject to suit. Even if they are, the possibility of execution on a judgment
against them is small. Obviously under these circumstances the school administrators may have an interest in prior inspection of the school produced newspapers. It should be added, however, all such fears notwithstanding, that reports of libel actions commenced against either students or
school officials based on school newspapers are few, and reports of judg1 58
ments nil.

The school's liability would not seem to be the same for the school
supported and sponsored newspaper as for those distributed on or near
the campus but produced elsewhere. Certainly as to the latter if there is
no right to pre-view or pre-censor on the part of the school administrators,
it would be difficult to see any basis for liability on the school's part, at
least absent a prolonged event which might give notice, or repetition
amounting to a pattern that might call for some protective action.
D. Due Process
The history of American freedom is,
in no small measure, the history of
procedure.'5 9

It is probably in procedural developments that Tinker will effect its
most significant results. Unfortunately, it is more difficult to dramatize
procedural rights which depend on stated or practiced routines than it is
to convey concepts of substantive rights associated with freedom of press,
freedom of speech, or freedom of religion. The growth of routine is prosaic. Procedures can subject the individual to an unequal and debilitating
156. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
157. Id. at 638.
158. The drastic reduction of the scope of liability of the press for libel underlines
this thought. See Rosenblum v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). One court has questioned whether a school newspaper enjoys
the same privilege as a commercial publication. Korn v. Elkins, 317 F. Supp. 138p 142 (D.
Md. 1970).
159. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The
distinction between the various constitutional rights is a subject of differing opinions. The
phrase is used here in its procedural sense. Obviously the clause implies far more than procedure, and at the same time does not cover all the important procedural rights found In
the fourth through eighth amendments, nor those found in the body of the Constitution.
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battle with an incoherent bureaucracy, giving little apparent reward in
return for the cumbersome operation involving the time and effort of
those concerned. The other side of the coin is that it is a brake on
rough justice; it is a limitation on those in power who "shoot from the
hip," on the ability to render decisions without documenting the need.
Tinker is not far removed in time from those cases which extended
judicial protection to minors. 1 0 Ironically, the recent decisions of the
Supreme Court are designed to protect youth against procedures developed late in the nineteenth century especially to protect youthful
offenders. The theory underlying the youthful offender legislation had
been that judicial devices adapted to adults were ill-suited to youngsters.
Thus, adversary safeguards designed to protect the accused gave way to
investigative and quasi-administrative procedures designed to treat rather
than to try the offender. The result was often the opposite of the intention. The lack of procedural safeguards removed the protection that older
offenders retained, frequently with little apparent benefit unless it was
that it facilitated the commitment of the accused. True, this was due as
well to other factors, such as lack of sufficient personnel, funds and
facilities. But especially because of these concomitant deficiences, the
loss of rights earlier accorded minors in court was important.
In criminal proceedings the question of "fairness" is co-extensive with
the procedure, i.e., the charge, the trial, the sentence and the appeals. In
the operation of schools procedure is, in a sense, a subordinate function.
Therefore, the comparison of the youthful offender in the court system
to the student at school has its limitations. In the former the litigation
is the whole of the procedure, whereas in the latter the objective is the
education of the child. Procedural fairness in the courts is as broad as the
process from complaint to commitment, while in the educational field
procedure is confined to a limited operational area. Thus, to determine
whether a rule governing conduct is reasonable it must be considered in
terms of the student's rights and the educational objective. But the educational objective itself is not subjected to a fairness test. True, there is an
increasing involvement of students in the rule making process." 1 But it
does not change the basic proposition that the school's primary objective
is to impart knowledge and skill, and that this objective is subjected to a
fairness test which impinges on the process only in certain specific areas
of operation. Cast in these terms, the problem becomes one of determining
how the school is to carry out its educational function and maintain order
160. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. S41 (1966).
161. See, e.g., Axtell v. LaPenna, 323 F. Supp. 1077, 1081 (W.). Pa. 1971); Schwartz v.
Galveston Independent School Dist., 309 F. Supp. 1034, 1036 (SD. Tex. 1970); Crossen v.
Fatsi, 309 F. Supp. 114, 116 (D. Conn. 1970).
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by means that conform to a concept of fairness. In one manner or another,
the phraseology of the courts discusses a test or balance between the
magnitude of the educational task and the harshness of the disciplinary
6 2

measure.1

While Tinker did not deal directly with procedural due process, this
may, as suggested earlier, ultimately be the area of its greatest effect.
First, the very assertion of the Court's concern for the constitutional
rights of minors within the schools and the explicit statement that the
exercise of the rights is not confined to approved classroom activities
dealing with noncontroversial matters indicates that there is a mandate to
provide "fundamental constitutional safeguards."' 0 3 Presumably this must
be accomplished by rules and practices that meet the requirements of
due process. 6 4 Second, the Court indicated that it would not accept an
administrative evaluation limited to the efficient running of the school,
nor an expression of apprehension of disturbance. There must be a "showing that the students' activities would materially and substantially disrupt
the work and discipline of the school." 0 In other words, to support or
justify disciplinary action the school officials will have to be prepared to
adduce proof in a legal sense at a hearing or similar proceeding. This requirement imposes a procedural burden which the school authorities must
be ready to bear. 6 The effect of this burden could be limited to careful
preparation on the part of sophisticated administrators or school boards.
Such an approach would reduce the procedure to a recitation by rote
that could develop into little more than a formula to reach or support the
desired result. But even this type of preparation imposes a brake on administrative action; it is a reminder of the possibility of review by
strangers who will judge the sufficiency of the actions and the grounds
162. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968) ("However, in the course
of evaluating the conflicting claims of First Amendment protection and the need for orderly
school administration in the context of this case, we shall indicate some of the general lines
along which an analysis of the controlling interests should run.").
163. 393 U.S. at 507.
164. An absence of a written rule does not mean that the school officials are powerless to
enforce discipline. Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 808 n.4 (2d Cir. 1971) ;
Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1282 (1st Cir. 1970). See also Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1088 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
165.
166.

393 U.S. at 513.
Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 810 (2d Cir. 1971); Katz v. McAulay,

438 F.2d 1058, 1060 (2d Cir. 1971), petition for cert. filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3558 (U.S. June 14,
1971) (No. 1817, 1970 Term; renumbered No. 70-272, 1971 Term); Crews v. Clones, 432
F.2d 1259, 1264 (7th Cir. 1970) ; Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10, 13 (7th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1971); see Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1282 n.3 (1st
Cir. 1970) ; Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1037 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937
(1970); Ferell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 392 F.2d 697, 702 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968).
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asserted. One is not as likely to be unfettered in his deeds if he has the
feeling that he is being observed.1 17 Of course, there is no reason to
assume that compliance with procedural due process will be universally
grudging. If the administration and school board are sufficiently sophisticated to learn the niceties of acceptable methods, it might be assumed
that they will be equally able and willing to absorb the objective of the
means to be employed. Efficiency of administration, if nothing else, will
dictate the need for correct action that will meet standards of fairness
which are acceptable to all segments of the school population.'"
One of the most important effects of Tinker is the reduction of the
relative weight to be given to the testimony of the school system's officials. 6 ' This effect is closely related to the new legal burden mentioned
above, in which it was suggested that the school as a party has been
given something akin to a burden of persuasion to show that its rules
or actions were justified. At the same time the officials must be aware
that the courts are no longer as likely as they heretofore have been to
accept the word of the educator in judgmental statements, even where
his expertise is involved. In this respect, Tinker reflects
the judiciary at
1 0
lower levels; it is confirmatory rather than leading.
Some might argue that Tinker does not indicate a qualitative weakening of the testimonial effect of educational witnesses. Certainly no statements appear to denigrate or discount this expertise. Indeed, one might
say that considerable importance was accorded the school's presentation
by pointing to the lack of "evidence that the school authorities had reason
to anticipate that the wearing of the armbands would substantially inter167. Is this not the same basis for alluding to the chilling effect of state activities where
first amendment rights are exercised? Cf. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604
(1967); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 811 (2d Cir. 1971). See also Pickering v. Board
of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968).
168. In New York State, the Commissioner of Education has indicated that a possibility
of disruption may be a sufficient reason for the school administrators to take action against the
harassers rather than the harassed, e.g., do not invoke a restrictive dress regulation but maintain order and discipline to protect non-conformists. In re Cossey, 9 N.Y. Educ. Dep't Rep.
11 (1969). For a similar approach see Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F2d 803 (2d
Cir. 1971).
169. E.g., Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 810 (2d. Cir. 1971) ("[I]f students choose to litigate, school authorities must demonstrate a reasonable basis for interference
with student speech, and ... [the] courts will not rest content with official's bare allegation
that such a basis existed.").
170. See Howard v. Clark, 59 Misc. 2d 327, 299 N.Y.S.2d 65 (Sup. CL 1969). Both Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 Fad 749 (5th Cir. 1966), and Burnside v. Byars,
363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966), were decided three years before Tinker.
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fere with the work of the school .... 1 171 In addition, the Court relied on
the testimony of the school authorities and the memorandum prepared
by them .1 2 But granted that such testimony was considered important, the
negative nature of the Court's evaluation is perhaps the most significant
aspect of the attention accorded. The opinion of the authorities as to the
importance of demonstrations was rejected. Their evaluation as to the
probable danger of disruption was disputed. The significance of the
majority's approach is emphasized by the fact that Mr. Justice Black,
reading the same record, felt that "[e]ven a casual reading of the record
shows that this armband did divert students' minds from their regular
lessons .... ,,173 Thus, in large part, the difference between the majority
and Mr. Justice Black lay in the stress each placed upon the testimony
of the authorities. This represents a trend away from the former unquestioning acceptance accorded the testimony of school officials.
In the past it was usual for the courts to refer to the noble pursuit of
the state in providing education, and on this basis to justify whatever
sacrifices were made to support it. 7 4 Education was a necessity for the
nation, but a privilege for the student. Viewed in this light, the privilege
was attended by conditions; if the conditions were not fulfilled by the
student, the privilege might be withdrawn. While there might have been
a sharp line drawn between university and preparatory education based
upon the usually voluntary nature of college attendance, in fact the decisional law was usually expressed in the same general terms, i.e., those of
privilege. Perhaps the fact that the major expansion of free compulsory
public schools was roughly contemporaneous with state supported colleges is the basis for the similarity. The feeling in the nineteenth century
was probably that a new benefit was being conferred on the lower classes
and that the individuals had to prove worthy of the gift. Not unlikely,
the fears of controlling the theretofore untaught and undisciplined, as
well as the experimental nature of the new venture, reinforced the stern
approach to learning which characterized education at the lower grades
prior to its becoming a mass public activity. The courts tended to accept
the authority of the schoolmaster with at least as much deference as was
accorded the executive branch of government in time of war. A sug171. 393 U.S. at 509.
172. Id. at 509 n.3.
173. Id. at 518 (dissenting opinion) ; see note 59 supra.
174. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923). Mr. Justice Holmes betrayed
pride of origin in Interstate Ry. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79 (1907): "Education Is one
of the purposes for which what is called the police power may be exercised. . . . Massachusetts always has recognized it as one of the first objects of public care." Id. at 87 (citation
omitted).
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gestion that a failure to wear a white armband would impede the learn-

ing process, or the sporting of a beard and sideburns would undermine
discipline in the school, was accepted not merely as persuasive expert

opinion, but as established fact. 1 5 Under these circumstances a constitutional argument based on the rights of pupils was unlikely to make

significant headway.
The expansion of constitutional rights within the schools has largely

taken place at the expense of the freedom of school administrators. If
the school official is looking for signs of aid and comfort in the courts,

possibly he will find it in expressions approximating "benign neglect."
The school system appears in court mainly as a defendant, the aggrieved

party being the pupil, the teacher, the citizen, or the taxpayer. One
readily apparent effect of Tinker was to swell the resort to judicial re-

view, especially by the federal courts. Recent case law may, however, herald an effort to limit the number of cases and the scope of
review, the practical result of which should be favorable to the school
76
officialdom.
Is a breach of order of a disciplinary nature better dealt with by an

adversary contest or by an administrative procedure involving educational, medical, psychiatric, or other professional aid in investigative and

therapeutic measures? In a sense, the courts may have suggested that
the use of modern science and skills might better be brought to bear

upon the problems of school society and its individuals than older, and
perhaps less relevant, legal concepts of "rights" in the abstract. In
Cosine v. Board of Education, 77 the New York Supreme Court rejected
175. See Calbillo v. San Jacinto Junior College, 305 F. Supp. 857 (S.D. Tex. 1969), rev'd,
434 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1970), clearly indicating that this is no longer the situation.
176. E.g., Farrell v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 1971) ("We would hope, perhaps
wistfully, that litigants and counsel on both sides would keep several things in mind before the
rush is made to the federal courts with constitutional banners waving high."). See also Mailloux v. Kiley, 436 F.2d 565 (1st Cir. 1971); Wood v. Alamo Heights Independent School Dist.,
308 F. Supp. 551 (W.D.Te.x.), aff'd per curiam, 433 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1970). A variation on
the theme is found in Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1971), where the
court held that regulations on hair length do not raise "'basic constitutional values' and are
not cognizable in federal courts." Id. at 262. The opinion referred to the "state[s'] ...compelling interest in the education of their children," and suggested that determinations of regulations be made by "their school authorities and their courts." Id. at 261. More specific in
its requirement of first pursuing all administrative procedures is Jackson v. Hepinstall, 328
F. Supp. 1104, 1107-08 (N.D.N.Y. 1971). But bear in mind that the fear of opening the
floodgates to litigation is not a constitutional test. See Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1038
(7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970) ; Parker v. Fry, 323 F. Supp. 728, 729 (E.D.
Ark. 1971).

177. 50 Misc. 2d 344, 270 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Sup. Ct. 1966), afPd without opinion, 27 App.
Div. 2d 905, 281 N.YS.2d 970 (1st Dep't 1967).
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a parent's demand for representation of a child at a hearing for suspension, saying that the procedure was "purely administrative in nature, and
. . . never punitive."' 78 The court suggested that the presence of legal
counsel would frustrate the purpose of the interview between parents and
school officials, turning it into a "quasi-judicial hearing.'1 7 The desire
to treat the underlying causes of disturbance in the student body and to
investigate and get at the roots of the problem is a readily understandable
approach. Similarly, the need for individual attention and aid for the
individual to help or reform rather than punish is desirable, having had
its counterpart in the movement to separate the juvenile from the adult
offender.8 0 But it shares with this development the problem of practical
shortcomings, i.e., the personnel and the facilities provided to help the
pupil may not be adequate to cope with the problem. Thus, the pupil
may be in the position of trading away rights for nonexistent aid. Hence,
phrasing the problem as a choice between legal rights in an adversary
setting and modern professional aid may be unrealistic. The choice may
not be available, and the individual may be forced to seize the first apparent aid at hand. This is more likely to be an appeal to a lawyer, especially since he is outside the system which threatens the individual.
In Madera v. Board of Education'" the question of the adequacy of
the system to aid the individual was brought more sharply into focus
than was true in Cosine. In the district court Judge Motley heard testimony and probed into the mechanics of the suspension from school and
its consequences. The court noted that the suspensory procedure could
lead not only to transfer to another school, but judicial proceedings and
possibly incarceration of up to two years. The drastic consequences of
the administrative conference, the court held, posed a danger of loss of
basic rights; therefore, legal representation was warranted.
When Madera reached the appellate level' the facts were reevaluated.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did not purport to differ on
the law, except insofar as it limited the requirement of legal representation to a proceeding for expulsion rather than one for suspensionYS3
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 344, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 232.
Id.
See text accompanying and following note 160 supra.
267 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390

U.S. 1028 (1968).
182. Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028
(1968).
183. Judge Thornton in Vought v. Van Buren Pub. Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D.
Mich. 1969), cited the appellate court decision in Madera when he overruled the school board
on expulsion in the first round. Id. at 1392. In the second round he held that tho record
did not show any infraction meriting expulsion. Id. at 1396.
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Judge Moore, speaking for the court, took issue with Judge Motley's
evaluation of the facts:
At the very outset it should be made clear what this case does not involve. First, the
Guidance Conference is not a criminal proceeding; thus, the counsel provision of the
Sixth Amendment and the cases thereunder are inapplicable. Second, there is no showing that any attempt is ever made to use any statement at the Conference in any
subsequent criminal proceeding . .. Therefore, there is no need for counsel to protect the child in his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.' 84

The opinion of Judge Moore is replete with references to the requirements of due process; the reversal cannot be read as an assertion that
constitutional rights do not exist in public schools. On the contrary, the
appellate bench premised its decision on the applicability of due process
to administrative procedures in public schools, and noted that "[t] he real
question is at what point along this chain is the full panoply of due
process safeguards to apply."'' s5 The Court took pains to state why in this
case, due process-specifically, the right to be represented by counseldid not apply. It observed that the consequences of the hearing were
either a return to the same school, transfer in grade to a similar school,
or, with the consent of the parents, transfer to a special school. Judge
Moore noted that a social worker from an agency familiar with the matter might be consulted by the parent, and stressed the non-punitive nature
of a conference from which no criminal sanction or prejudice at a subsequent judicial proceeding could result.
It is noteworthy that the appellate court relied on the factual findings
of the lower court and did not contradict what would appear to be significant and disturbing comments. While the guidance conference was not
of a criminal nature and did not purport to be punitive, it was in fact
simultaneous with a family court proceeding commenced by the school
authorities. Although the latter proceeding was dismissed, the dismissal
was attended by a finding that the minor was a person in need of super184. 386 F.2d at 780 (footnote omitted).

185. Id. at 785. The recent history of physical confrontation and the growth of drug re-

lated cases have sharpened difficult procedural problems for attorneys where administrative
procedures involving suspension and court proceedings following arrest may be pending
simultaneously. The rule is that the pendency of a criminal proceeding does not foredose a
school hearing on the same subject. In re Manigaulte, 63 Misc. 2d 76S, 313 N.Y.S.2d 322
(Sup. Ct. 1970); see Johnson v. Board of Educ., 62 M11isc. 2d 929, 310 NT.Y.S.2d 429 (Sup.
Ct. 1970). However, there are some limited advantages if the proceeding in court affords the
"youthful offender" protection; it may not form any part of the charge or evidence in the
suspensory hearing. In re Rodriguez, 8 N.Y. Educ. Dep't Rep. 214, 217-18 (1969). The requirement of due process may sometimes call for little more than being aware that substantial rights are involved and are not to be dealt with lightly. Thus, in Goldwyn v. Allen, 54 Misc.
2d 94, 281 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct. 1967), a proctor's letter was held to constitute insufficient
basis upon which to suspend a pupil for cheating.
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vision. 8" This authorized further action, leading the district court to
conclude that the charge of juvenile delinquency made by the school
administration was not moot, and that the conference could not be
viewed as unrelated to the possibility of further judicial action. The evidence adduced at the federal trial indicated that the ostensibly benign
suspension might indeed have highly serious consequences. There were
instances, Judge Motley noted, where, for lack of a special school or
other facilities, pupils had in fact been excluded from school for as long
was out for nine
as seven or eight months, and in one instance a student
87
months, only to be returned to his original school.1
If Judge Moore's decision indicates a greater reticence to leap into the
school scene where the particular case does not itself furnish a clear example of the shortcomings of the system, the opinion is clearly consistent
with the trend toward greater judicial concern. Judge Moore observed
that the procedure of the school system showed "a high regard for the
best interest and welfare of the child."' 88 Thus, if the school administrator
believes that Judge Moore is more ready than Judge Motley to support
his authority, he can scarcely expect to rely on that support without a
showing of fairness and concern for the pupil.
In large part the views of the courts may illustrate a different skepticism, each in its own way healthy. Judge Motley may cast a dubious
eye on the responsiveness and efficacy of the educational bureaucracy
with respect to the needs of the disadvantaged. It is easy to imagine the
potential fear of a minority group individual, who possibly speaks little
English, ensnared in the massive machinery of the school administration
where shortage of personnel, time, and funds can easily lead to the disposition of troublesome cases on the basis of administrative efficiency. 8 9
Judge Moore, however, viewing the same picture, would have us consider
whether an emphasis on legal rights, in effect a trial by ordeal, is the most
reliable method of achieving "the best interest and welfare of the
child." 90 In this regard one may expect that what formerly might have
been expressed in terms of the presence or absence of legal rights will
now find its expression in factual terms. This reflects a continuing problem
which is not likely to pass, for it is in the nature of due process to con186. See N.Y. Family Ct. Act art. 7 (McKinney 1963), which governs this type of adjudication.
187. 267 F. Supp. at 368.
188. 386 F.2d at 789.
189. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1966), describing the lack of personnel and expressing concern over the fact that the "child receives the worst of both worlds."
Id. at 556.
190. 386 F.2d at 789.
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stantly require redefinition. It is the focal point of competing rights in a
constantly changing environment in which the involvement of people
and resources is large, and the functions of vital importance.
It may be inferred that the different factual evaluations represent a
different frame of legal reference and general approach to the question of
"authority." It is similar to the factual differences described by Mr. Justice Fortas and Mr. Justice Black in their respective opinions in Tinker.
The remarks of Judge Moore in Madera probably reflect a large segment
of current thinking today both on and off the bench:
Law and order in the classroom should be the responsibility of our respective educational systems. The courts should not usurp this function and turn disciplinary problems, involving suspension into criminal adversary proceedings-which they definitely
are not. The rules, regulations, procedures and practices disclosed on this record
evince a high regard for the best interest and welfare of the child. The courts would
do well to recognize this.19 '

Judge Motley's opinion is representative of judicial scrutiny of the actual
workings of school administration. She seeks sufflciently strict procedures
to assure that the individual's rights will not be ignored. However, it
should be observed that formal administrative hearings can create their
own cumbersome bureaucracy. The phrase in which Judge Moore referred
to "the full panoply of due process"' 9 2 indicates that the court had this
in mind. The time and the expense involved in administrative hearings
and procedures may be comparable on occasion to that of the courts in
making "constitutional rights" an ephemeral concept for the pupil in the
ghetto.
Both Cosine and Madera preceded Tinker, certiorari having been denied in Madera93 at nearly the same time it was granted in Tinker."3
Although it is axiomatic that denials of certiorari are not to be accorded
any significance, it is of some import that the Court felt sufficiently moved
to take one matter, but presumably was not disturbed by the result
reached in the other. The timing suggests that the result in Madera
would not be modified by the Supreme Court's decision in Tinker. Since
Madera has been cited in school disciplinary matters with a frequency
second only to that of Tinker, this suggestion may be important as a
guide to the lower courts.195
The dividing line between the first amendment liberties and due process
191. Id. at 788-89.
192. Id. at 785; see text accompanying note 185 supra.
193. Madera v. Board of Educ., 390 U.S. 1028 (1968).
194. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 390 U.S. 942 (1968).
195. However, Madera was not cited by the Supreme Court in Tinker, although other
lower court opinions which dealt with first amendment questions were.
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as a procedural aspect of those liberties appears, at times, to be vague.
The Supreme Court has occasionally referred to the due process aspects
of the first amendment in cases dealing with free speech and free press.
While the thoughts may be conceptually distinct, in practice a curb on
freedom must occur through some act or invocation of some rule which
therefore raises the question of the fairness or reasonableness of the act
or rule. The situation is illustrated by the twin decisions written by
Judge Gewin in Burnside v. Byars,' and Blackwell v. IssaquenaCounty
Board of Education.17 Since these cases were cited with approval by the
Supreme Court in Tinker, they are of peculiar importance as guides in
interpreting the scope of that decision. The Burnside child was a high
school pupil who was suspended for a week after wearing "freedom" buttons containing the words, "One Man One Vote" and the initials "SNCC."
The school principal had told several students that displaying such
buttons was against the rules which, he later testified, were designed to
avoid commotion."" The court noted the fact that the resolution had
not been enforced for "Beatle" buttons nor other buttons reading "His"
and "Hers." When the students continued to wear the proscribed buttons,
the principal told them they had the choice of removing the buttons or
being sent home. The Burnside girl was one of those who selected the latter alternative for which she received a one week suspension. An injunctive suit followed in which the district court denied the relief sought.
Although the district court apparently accepted the principal's conclusion that the display of the buttons caused a commotion, 99 the court
of appeals scrutinized it.20 0 Judge Gewin observed that the "record indicate[d] only a showing of mild curiosity on the part of the other school
children .

. . ."2

It was conceded at the trial that the basis of the sus-

pension was not disruption but breach of the school regulation. The court
then distinguished button-wearing from "activities which inherently distract students and break down the regimentation of the classroom such
as carrying banners, scattering leaflets, and speechmaking, all of which
are protected methods of expressions, but all of which have no place in
an orderly classroom. 2 0 2 It is notable that the brief suspension from
school of the Burnside child followed appropriate admonitions and was
based on written rules. Further, there was no indication of harsh, precipitate, or inconsiderate administrative action. Nevertheless, the appellate
196. 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
197. 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
198. 363 F.2d at 746-47.
199. It accepted his conclusion at least to the extent that the judge refused to grant the
preliminary injunction.
200. 363 F.2d at 747-48.
201. Id. at 748.
202. Id.
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court, in its pre-Tinker decision, held the denial of the temporary injunction to be an abuse of discretion.
Judge Gewin was allowed an opportunity for Solomonic justice when
on the same day he announced a decision supporting the school authorities
where the buttons containing the same words were worn at another
school. In Blackwell the refusal to grant a temporary injunction was
affirmed. There, some of the pupils placed unrequested buttons on other
pupils. As a result, "a younger child ... began crying," and there was
"confusion, disrupted class instruction, and ...a general breakdown of
orderly discipline ...

2 0 These events occurred in February, and were

followed by the suspension of the children for the balance of the Spring
term. Upholding this result, the court of appeals stated: "It is always
within the province of school authorities to provide by regulation the
prohibition and punishment of acts calculated to undermine the school
routine. This is not only proper in our opinion but is necessary.""
Although Judge Gewin spoke of a regulation in Blackwell, no specific
rule was referred to and none was quoted as in Burnside. The only mention of the rule was the reference to the principal's statement to the pupils
that the buttons would have to be removed. In a literal sense, therefore, the
Blackwell case does not seem to be as much a case supporting reasonable rules as one supporting reasonable conduct to maintain order. The
decision also indicates that an attempt to draw the line between substantive issues, i.e., liberties, under the first and fourteenth amendments,
and the procedural issues arising out of the exercise of the substantive
rights may be difficult and not altogether necessary. If, in the court's
opinion, reasonableness is lacking, the judge will find against the exercise
of school authority, not necessarily indicating the precise rationale. The
Supreme Court in Tinker seemed to be fully in accord with both BlackwellM5 and Burnside.3
The fact that Burnside and Blackwell involved preliminary injunctions
should carry special authority in civil rights school cases-at least those
cases involving substantially similar modes of communication in a peaceful setting. Nevertheless, since the measure of due process is often likely
to be the conscience of the court, results such as the one in Einhorn v.
Maus- 7 may occur from time to time. If the judge there upheld free
speech, he seemed to have done so with a curious perception of due
process. Twelve minors commenced suit to enjoin school officials from
placing on their school records notations that they "distributed literature
203. 363 F.2d at 751.
204. Id. at 753.
205. 393 U.S. at 513.
206. Id. at 505, 509, 511, 513.
207. 300 F. Supp. 1169 (ED. Pa. 1969).
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or wore an arm band bearing the legend 'HUMANIZE EDUCATION' at
the graduation ceremonies ....208 The district court noted that this
peaceful expression was fully protected under Tinker; however, "[s] chool
officials have the right and ...a duty to record and to communicate true
factual information about their students to institutions of higher learning, for the purpose of giving to the latter an accurate and complete picture of applicants for admission.1 20 The court purported to see no
irreparable harm in this, holding that its possible effect on subsequent
graduates posed no threat of immediate damage. If such is the case one
wonders what the duty was to record such "factual information." It appears to be an irrelevant and bizarre bit of information out of the thousands of details that might be noted.2 10 The Einhorn case may perhaps
best be regarded as a sport-the type of result that may occur in a broad
jurisdiction where uniformity is an objective not instantly achieved.
Often, the differing results are obscured by laying careful stress on factual variances which reinforce the statement of the accepted legal principle. Others illustrate the deep emotional chords that the school situations
touch where the feelings of the judiciary reflect the sensitivities of their
community. Cases of personal appearance seem to be preeminent in this
regard.
Tinker specifically stopped short of the subject of personal appearance, 21 1 making it clear that it was not, on that occasion at least, part of
pure speech. Certain items of personal appearance may qualify as political
expression, and perhaps then as "pure speech," although it would be difficult to draft a regulation calculated to allow political expression, but stop
short of "pure fashion." In Wood v. Alamo Heights Independent School
District,212 the court noted the Tinker exclusion and passed on to consider
whether the regulations concerning students' hair were reasonable. Upon
entering an area so dominated by changing fashions, it seems hard to
avoid a determination of "reasonableness" that is related to the personal
notion of the individual judge, or to the belief that this subject is better
left to the school officials. 21 3 The Wood decision seemed close to the latter
208. Id. at 1170.
209. Id. at 1171.
210. In Crossen v. Fatsi, 309 F. Supp. 114 (D. Conn. 1970), the court, after finding a

grooming regulation unconstitutionally vague, directed that the notation on the student's
record that he had violated the regulation be expunged. The same result followed in Goldwyn
v. Allen, 54 Misc. 2d 94, 281 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct. 1967), and In re Bustin, No. 8257 (N.Y.
Educ. Dep't, March 25, 1971).
211. 393 U.S. at 507-08.
212. 308 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd per curiam, 433 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1970).
213. The standard of "reasonableness" was attacked as "evanescent" in the most recent
case on the subject of hair. Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 261 (10th Cir. 1971).

The court found that the regulations were motivated by legitimate concerns, observing that
"the problem, if it exists, is one for the states .

. . ."

Id. at 259. For the opposite view see
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proposition when it suggested that judges would be well advised to " 'get
out of the business of running schools ....
21 However, the judge in
Wood did inject an additional test into his conclusion that the rule was
reasonable when he noted that its adoption followed consultation between
administrators and students. -15 This would appear to emphasize the
importance in the factual presentation of school cases. Some indication
of fairness, of communication, of attempts at persuasion, will go a long
way toward predisposing a court in favor of the school administrator.
Such a showing should come close to being a sine qua non in any educational authority case.
In school cases the courts' decisions as to facts and law are not distinct. They come closer to those mixed questions left for the jury in tort
actions. But the considerations are more elusive. The court must not only
determine the facts out of a welter of highly emotional testimony, but it
must assess the "thrust" of those facts. Thus, is the wearing of an item
at a given time the cause of, or about to become the cause of disturbance
or violence? At what point does the danger become reasonably apprehended, especially in a setting involving children from five to eighteen
years of age.210 Further, if decided one way or the other, what will be
the precedential impact of the ruling? For courts to shy away from this
particular class of lawsuits is not surprising. If they cannot avoid jurisdiction, courts will very likely attempt to dispose of such cases by whatever route provides a workable rationale.
Whether dress and hair regulations merit the attention given them is
an argument that may be employed both ways. The courts can say that
Calbillo v. San Jacinto Junior College, 305 F. Supp. 857, 862 (S.D. Tex. 1969), rev'd, 434
F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1970) ("[Rlegulations promulgated upon some unrealized fear or regulations fashioned to implement personal tastes of some school officials cannot be tolerated.").
214. 308 F. Supp. at 554. See also Schwartz v. Galveston Independent School Dist., 309
F. Supp. 1034, 1047 (S.D. Tex. 1970). For an earlier expression regarding college students
see Steier v. New York State Educ. Comm'r, 271 F.2d 13, 18 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 966 (1960), but note also Judge Clark's dissenting opinion.
215. However, if the court determines that the regulation is unconstitutional, the "fairness"
of its adoption will not save it. Axtell v. LaPenna, 323 F. Supp. 1077, 1081 (W.D. Pa. 1971);
Crossen v. Fatsi, 309 F. Supp. 114 (D. Conn. 1970). See also In re Johnson, 9 N.Y. Educ.
Dep't Rep. 14 (1969), approving involvement in formulating standards and regulations, but
holding that "[absent ... specific educational purpose, the imposition of a uniform manner
of dress and the restriction of choice violate the individual rights of students and parents
... " Id. at 15.
216. The court held the grooming regulation in Crossen v. Fatsi, 309 F. Supp. 114 (D.
Conn. 1970), unconstitutionally vague, citing Tinker, notwithstanding the exclusionary remarks made there. However, after observing that the boy's moustache and sideburns did
not disrupt classroom decorum, the court stated that "that alone is not a true test . .. ."
Id. at 118. The danger of turmoil justified regulation. Indeed, the court noted that compulsory attendance (usually a basis for recognizing the students' rights) necessitated discipline, i.e., regulation. Id. at 119.
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it is not a problem of significance in terms of political expression or of
communicating ideas; therefore an already overloaded judiciary should
not be distracted with such trivia.11 7 But the courts might also say that
this subject does not really merit such an expenditure of the energy of
school administrators. Furthermore, judges may inquire as to whether
there is any factual knowledge to support glib assertions of distraction
and disruption. 218 Might it not be said that school administrators are
wasting time on inconsequential matters since respectable school authority has indicated that the walls will not come tumbling down if these
questions are removed from the jurisdiction of the administrator and left
to the student? 19
The personal appearance cases may be set to one side as a sort of
special category, similar to that of obscenities, in that they often provoke
quick negative reactions among adults. 220 While they provoke incidents
217. But see reference to "trivial" rights in Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1285
(1st Cir. 1970) ; text accompanying notes 238-56 infra.
218. One court did so. Pritchard v. Spring Branch Independent School Dist., 308 F. Supp.
570, 579 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
219. In New York the school boards and administration have been limited by rulings of
the commissioner. E.g., In re McQuade, 6 N.Y. Educ. Dep't Rep. 36 (1966) (girls' western
style boots allowed); In re Dalrymple, 5 N.Y. Educ. Dep't Rep. 113 (1966) (girls' slacks
allowed). In the latter case, the commissioner referred to an 1874 ruling of the state superintendent denying the school board's authority over a girl's hair style. Id. at 116-17. Physical
danger or a style "so distractive as to interfere with the learning and teaching process" are
stated as permissible grounds for regulation. Id. at 115. In Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034,
1037 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970), the court flatly rejected an argument that even if there is no justification for the rule, the disciplinary power of school
authorities will suffer if their regulation is not upheld in court.
220. Another group of cases that produces unpredictable results is that of the national
symbol, i.e., the flag, the National Anthem, and the Pledge of Allegiance. The same district
saw one result under a ruling by Judge Judd (Frain v. Baron, 307 F. Supp. 27 (E.D.N.Y.
1969)), where exclusion from the classroom for refusal to either salute or stand silently
was held unconstitutional, and the opposite result under a ruling by Judge Travia (Richards
v. Board of Educ., No. 70 Civ. 625 (E.D.N.Y., July 10, 1970)). In Lapolla v. Duflaglian,
63 Misc. 2d 157, 163, 311 N.Y.S.2d 435, 441 (Sup. Ct. 1970), an official action was held improper where a board of education had the flag lowered in memory of the four students
killed in Kent, Ohio. This was held to be "an expression of political dissent" violating the
board's obligation to remain neutral. The political problem in Lapolla was perhaps more
significant than the national symbol. In Nistad v. Board of Educ., 61 Misc. 2d 60, 304
N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. 1969), where students were allowed to voluntarily absent themselves
from school for a political demonstration, it was held to be an improper pressure upon other
students to state a political view. Apparently none of the foregoing cases was appealed. All
shared the problem of responding to highly emotional subjects. Although approaching the
subject from different vantages, e.g., Frain was a suit by an individual based on right of
conscience while Lapolla was a suit by a group to enjoin a board, a rationale could be
made: school authorities are limited in either committing any acts impinging upon expressions
of personal views or expressing their own views where political or religious considerations
are involved. Whether in fact this will be the rule will depend on cases yet to come. However,
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which may lead to a test of constitutional privileges, the importance of
the activity protected or excluded is highly debatable. The same cannot
be said of issues in the political arena such as the Vietnam War, nor of
social phenomena such as the drug problem. In Tinker the Court set
forth in broad strokes its views on political liberties as practiced in the
schools, a subject to which the decision was specifically directed. As
noted earlier,2' Mr. Justice Black inferred that the decision went well
beyond the immediate question under consideration, and Justice Stewart,
who concurred, and Justice Harlan, who dissented, appeared to be in
agreement in this, although differing as to the extent. It seems fair to
conclude that the Court's assertion of constitutional rights held by public school pupils will not be limited to political subject matter. For either
the children have constitutional rights or they do not, and with the
conclusion that they do have them there does not appear to be any basis
for limiting such rights to a particular area. Again, the manner in which
those rights are described will vary, but obviously the Tinker holding cannot be ignored in such areas as the drug problem. In fact, irrespective of
Tinker, there was a "tightening" of judicial attitude with respect to this
difficult area.2-2 Indeed, the tightening of procedural due process has not
been a result of court action alone. In New York State, the Commissioner
of Education insisted upon due process and a hearing in a pre-Tinker
case of expulsion,2- 3 relying on In re Gaudt,224 Ml adera,5 and Dixon v.
2 26 This is
State Board of Education.
further evidence supporting the statement made earlier in this article,2 that Tinker is, in large measure, an
opinion confirming a movement toward greater emphasis on the rights of
young people. Clearly the school boards, administrations and teaching
staffs have as great an interest in this movement as do those not directly
connected with the educational institutions. It is not so much a question
of change by compulsion from outside the system as stating the legal
guidelines for the changes that have been taking place.
this is in accord with Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 US. 97, 103 (1968), which said that the
government "must be neutral" in religious matters.
221.

See note 49 supra and accompanying text.

222. See, e.g., Howard v. Clark, 59 Misc. 2d 327, 299 N.Y.S.2d 65 (Sup. Ct. 1969), where
judge Grady held that an arrest in a drug case could not be the basis of a suspension.
223. In re Cuffee, 7 N.Y. Educ. Dep't Rep. 60 (1967) (involving charge of assault on or
by teacher). For more recent cases see In re Port, 9 N.Y. Educ. Dep't Rep. 107 (1970); In
re Rodriguez, 8 N.Y. Educ. Dep't Rep. 214 (1969) (involving drugs, necessity of notice to
afford legal counsel, and specifically voiding exclusion based on arrest, and noting that the
youthful offender provision prohibited "adjudication alone" from acting as a basis for

expulsion).
224.
225.

387 U.S. 1 (1967).
See notes 181-95 supra and accompanying text.

226.
227.

294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
See text accompanying note 170 supra.
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Insofar as specific procedures are concerned, the college-oriented caset

Dixon set forth ground rules which have been used for cases dealing
with the high schools. Upon holding that the university had failed to observe the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the student, Judge Rives
outlined the procedure to be followed:
For the guidance of the parties in the event of further proceedings, we state our
views on the nature of the notice and hearing required by due process prior to expulsion from a state college or university. They should, we think, comply with the
following standards. The notice should contain a statement of the specific charges
and grounds which, if proven, would justify expulsion under the regulations of the
Board of Education. The nature of the hearing should vary depending upon the circumstances of the particular case. The case before us requires something more than
an informal interview with an administrative authority of the college. By its nature, a
charge of misconduct, as opposed to a failure to meet the scholastic standards of the
college, depends upon a collection of the facts concerning the charged misconduct,
easily colored by the point of view of the witnesses. In such circumstances, a hearing
which gives the Board or the administrative authorities of the college an opportunity
to hear both sides in considerable detail is best suited to protect the rights of all
involved. This is not to imply that a full-dress judicial hearing, with the right to
cross-examine witnesses, is required. .... In the instant case, the student should be
given the names of the witnesses against him and an oral or written report on the
facts to which each witness testifies. He should also be given the opportunity to present to the Board, or at least to an administrative official of the college, his own
defense against the charges and to produce either oral testimony or written affidavits
of witnesses in his behalf. If the hearing is not before the Board directly, the results
and findings of the hearing should be presented in a report open to the student's inspection. If these rudimentary elements of fair play are followed in a case of misconduct of this particular type, we feel that the requirements of due process of law
228
will have been fulfilled.

Another instance of guidelines is found in the General Order of the
Western District of Missouri,2 29 and in a more limited subject area, in
Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education230 discussed earlier in this article.
In that case the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit spoke of the
difficulty of establishing rules for "the unique social structure prevailing
in a public school system of secondary schools,"1231 and observed that
"[t]he problems raised by this case defy geometric solutions."2 3 2 Inherent
in the problems of due process is the necessity for fair procedure and
the difficulty of achieving it. "The very nature of due process negates any
concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation. ' 233 It is to be expected therefore that many of the writ228. 294 F.2d at 158-59.
229. 45 F.R.D. 133 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (adopted en banc, it applies to "tax supported in-

stitutions of higher education.").
230. 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971); see text accompanying notes 117-26 supra.
231.

440 F.2d at 804.

232. Id. at 804 n.1.
233. Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
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ten regulations will fail for being too vague or too broad.234 The absence
of such rules does not mean, however, that a school administrator is
either enjoined or excused from taking action where danger threatens. 23
But these situations should be regarded as exceptional; they should not
be relied upon as an alternative to clear guidelines. As stated by the
court in Eisner:
Finally, greater specificity might reduce the likelihood of future litigation and thus
forestall the possibility that federal courts will be called upon again to intervene in
the operation of Stamford's public schools. It is to everyone's advantage that decisions with respect to the operation of local schools be made by local officials. The greater
the generosity of the Board in fostering-not merely tolerating-students' free exercise of their constitutional rights, the less likely it will be that local officials will find
their rulings subjected to unwieldy constitutional litigation.230

In drafting rules it must be borne in mind that the purpose is to guide,

not to punish, to indicate permissible, if not desirable activities, and to
facilitate rather than to inhibit such activity. Vagueness is not only bad
in a constitutional sense; it is bad because it is not a guide. "Finally, in
cases of minor discipline particularly, parent, student, and administrator
should remember that substitution of common sense
for zealous adherence
t 7
to legal positions is not absolutely prohibited. 2
E. The Freedom to Do as One Pleases and Miscellany

If civil rights are discussed in terms of training for participation in a
democratic society, or for protection against specific abuses, Tinker pro-

vides a logical framework. But if one moves to the broader constitutional
m
'
concept of "freedom from bodily restraint,"2

or the right "to be let

alone,"m 9 the logic does not fare as well. The pupil must be in school by

virtue of laws mandating compulsory attendance. There is nothing in
Tinker nor its progeny which indicates that the laws requiring "each
minor [to] ... attend upon full time instruction12 40 have been modified.

Consequently, it must be concluded that the constitutional rights of minors
are markedly different from those of adults2 41 because of the "special char234. Crossen v. Fatsi, 309 F. Supp. 114 (D. Conn. 1970); Sullivan v. Houston Independent School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
235. Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971) ; Richards v. Thurston,
424 F.2d 1281, 1282 (1st Cir. 1970).
236. 440 F.2d at 810.
237. Farrell v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 1971).
238. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US. 390, 399 (1923).
239. T. Cooley, Torts 29 (2d ed. 1888), quoted in Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 US.
250, 251 (1891). This was a personal injury case in which the Court held the plaintiff could
not be ordered to submit to surgery. See also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 US. S57 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
240. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3205(1) (a) (McKinney 1970).
241. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (denial of jury trial in the
juvenile court). See also Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir.
1969). Mr. justice Blackmun, then a judge of the court of appeals, stated that first amend-

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

acteristics of the school environment,"'2 and because the child is compelled to attend school. The only freedom involved in this area is the
parent's choice between public and private education.243
Although the right to personal liberty is often discussed as an aspect
of due process, 2 44 it clearly is much broader than the procedural safeguards that that clause connotes.145 Indeed, as noted above, neither the
fifth nor the fourteenth amendment tells what the liberty protected
is, but only that it is not to be taken away without due process of law.
The growth of the concept of freedom from bodily restraint, as expressed
in judicial literature, came more than a century after the Constitution
was written. Even then, considering the myriad activities and subjects
the topic of personal liberty covers, there have been remarkably few
cases concerning them. Probably no single source has furnished more
specifics during the past few years than the length and style of students'
hair, a subject briefly discussed earlier in this article.24 While it might be
suspected that there are more important problems to occupy the scholarship of the legal profession, the research evident in the opinions concerning hair has contributed important pages defining basic rights which
heretofore existed more in theory than practice. In Richards v. Thurston147 the district court held that a "principal's personal prejudice" does
not suffice to mandate hair styles.2 48 The court stated that "when the personal liberty claimed by a minor or an adult has a high order of importance the state must make a strong showing of the need of its curtailment.1 24 9 In affirming, the court of appeals 25° rejected the theory that
ment rights applied in the classroom and even, to a great extent, in the prison. Id. at 1085.
Rights are thus available in varying degrees to different categories of people with age alone
not being the distinguishing factor. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
242. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506

(1969).
243.
Opinion
244.
245.
(1908),

Or under very limited circumstances the parent may furnish home instruction.
of Counsel, No. 143, 4 N.Y. Educ. Dep't Rep. 220 (1964).
Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1284 (1st Cir. 1970).
The term has never been precisely defined. In Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78
constitutional rights were discussed in terms of local and national citizenship, and a

distinction was made between fifth and fourteenth amendment "privileges" and "due process."
However, Mr. Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion is probably closer to modern thought. Id.
at 114. The specific source of the "bodily" rights is subject to more doubts today than was
apparently true sixty years ago. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (penumbra
rights). It is interesting to note Mr. Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in that case.
Id. at 486. See also Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1037 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
937 (1970).

246. See text accompanying notes 211-20 supra.
247. 304 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1969), aff'd, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970).
248. Id. at 451.
249. Id. at 452.

250. Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970).
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hair style is protected by the first amendment, 2 but proceeded to analyze
the meaning of "liberty" in the due process clause. Apparently unsatisfied with the available case law, Circuit Judge Coffin reviewed the debate
concerning the first amendment, noting that it was not deemed "necessary
to write an amendment for personal appearance.1 25 2 He concluded that

"the right to wear one's hair as he wishes" is within "the commodious
'
concept of liberty."253
Even though the court acknowledged that some
would term the right trivial, it held hair style to be a matter of personal
liberty for which "the countervailing interest must either be self-evident
or be affirmatively shown. ' 254 It came as no surprise that the court of
appeals held no such showing was made, and unanimously affirmed the
district court decision. Since Richards did not go up to the Supreme
Court, the "hair" cases are left at a stand-off, the Court having denied
certiorari in Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District,21 where
school regulation of hair length was upheld, and in Breen v. Kahl,"
where a similar restriction was declared unconstitutional.
The district court observed in Richards that there were restrictions
upon the exercise of one's liberties; thus, "the right to appear au naturel
at home is relinquished when one sets foot on a public sidewalk." T
In the same way, a rule which limits skirt lengths "while on school grounds
would require less justification" than hair regulations which affect an individual's conduct over a significant period of time away from the school
grounds. 5 While the court was not proscribing regulations, it was insisting that the regulations be relevant to the operation of the school and that
the non-school impact be considered. 5- 9 The non-school impact test, which
251. Id. at 1283; cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Contra, Carter v.
Hodges, 317 F. Supp. 89, 95 (W.D. Ark. 1970).
252. 424 F.2d at 1285 (footnote omitted).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1286. Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1971), the most recent hair
case is, in effect, at the other end of the spectrum from Richards. The opinion expressed
concern at the amount of litigation on the subject, noting: "We are convinced that the
United States Constitution and statutes do not impose on the federal courts the duty
and responsibility of supervising the length of a student's hair." Id. at 259. Obviously the
court was not asked to do that.
255. 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968).
256. 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970). The claimed unconstitutionality of grooming regulations under the ninth amendment has been accepted by some
courts (e.g., Breen), and rejected by others. Miller v. Gillis, 315 F. Supp. 94, 100 (N.M. IL
1969).
257. 424 F.2d at 1285.
258. Id.
259. The Commissioner of Education of New York State used the same criterion in upholding a ban on the wearing of berets during classroom instruction. In re Jimenez, 9 N.Y.
Educ. Dep't Rep. 172 (1970). Also rejected was the claim that the berets had political
significance and that the ban was a denial of equal rights because others were permitted
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seems to be the most common sense approach, may be headed for further
judicial scrutiny in the near future since several states presently purport
to give school officials fairly broad quasi-disciplinary powers extending
beyond the school grounds. For example, California obligates teachers
to "hold pupils to a strict account for their conduct on the way to and
from school . . . ,120 and apparently expects that both principals and
teachers will, in the exercise of morality, supervise the pupils so that
they do not use tobacco, narcotics, and intoxicating liquors on the school
grounds or elsewhere.2 6'
By contrast, New York's statutory provisions regarding geographic
jurisdiction over pupils are limited to attendance enforcement, giving
school authorities the right to arrest unlawfully absent minors and the
right of entry into factories or mercantile establishments for the purpose
of affecting such arrests. 262 However, decisional law has expanded the
ambit of the school's jurisdiction to include field trips and sports or band
activities carried out under the responsibility and authority of the board
of education. 26 3 Activities immediately outside the school gates which
20
affect the school children have been held subject to school authority, '
but the extent of this jurisdiction is disputed every foot of the way. 0
Hence, while school authorities cannot ignore events which occur outside
the confines of school grounds and have an impact upon the students, their
authority will be sharply limited by the educational objective they pursue. In addition, the connection between the exercise of any power to
activities in the school must be reasonably close in time and place, and
conscious effort must be made to restrict any extra-school effect where
the sphere of personal liberty is concerned.
An area of unavoidable difficulty both legally and practically is the
question of student arrest, search and seizure, and the consequences
flowing from these acts. The problem has been magnified by the impact
to wear yarmulkes (religious skullcaps). Id. See also Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970).
260. Cal. Educ. Code § 13557 (West 1969).
261. Cal. Admin. Code tit. 5, § 301 (1969).
262. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3213 (McKinney 1970).
263. The Commissioner of Education of New York State ruled that a child could be
required to accompany a band off campus during non-school hours where the pupil was en-

rolled in that activity. In re Ingersoll, 6 N.Y. Educ. Dep't Rep. 137 (1967). See also Monroe
v. Board of Comm'rs, 244 F. Supp. 353, 364 (E.D. Tenn. 1965), remanded, 380 F.2d 955 (6th
Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 391 U.S. 450 (1968).
264. Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517, 525 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
265. People v. Jackson, 65 Misc. 2d 909, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731 (App. T. 1971) (arrest of a

student by the coordinater of discipline three blocks away from the school held valid);
People v. Sprowal, 49 Misc. 2d 806, 268 N.Y.S.2d 444 (App. T.), aff'd mem., 17 N.Y.2d 884,
218 N.E.2d 343, 271 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1966), appeal dismissed per curiam, 385 U.S. 649 (1967)
(distance of 300 feet from school held to be too far for arrest; distance of 200 to 300 feet
held to be close enough).
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of the widespread use of drugs. Indeed, the dimensions of the questions
raised are such that only a bare suggestion of the complications can be
made here.
An arrest of a student may take place on or off the school grounds.
While it may appear that an arrest away from school property is of no
concern to school officials, the probability is that the school will become
involved in court or court related proceedings, if for no other reason than
the student's absence from class during his incarceration. In times past,
the mere word "arrest," just as the word "pregnancy,"260 summoned up
visions of moral disease which seemed a self-evident basis for action if the
malady was not to spread. The trigger reaction to arrest has been accentuated by the so-called "drug-culture" to such an extent that administrators
automatically suspend arrested students to safeguard the student body
2 7
from potential harm. The drug scene has caused both judicial reaction,
and counter-reaction. 26 s Legislative action to forestall automatic suspension has called for a stricter adherence to due process, and administra" and decreased2 70
tive rulings have successively increased2 69
the due process requirements to be accorded public school pupils.
The problem facing school authorities is that they have obligations both
to the arrested or suspected student and to the student body at large.
Because of their obligation to society and their desire to protect school
children, school officials exhibit a natural desire to cooperate with police
investigative agents. But the officials must bear in mind that they may
possess information of a confidential nature,2 7 ' and that their "custody"
or authority with respect to pupils is limited. The request to provide
record information, and the request for oral or written statements from
266. Ordway v. Hargraves, 323 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Mlass. 1971).
267. Howard v. Clark, 59 Misc. 2d 327, 299 N.Y.S.2d 65 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
268. Bastianelli v. Board of Educ., 65 Misc. 2d 11, 316 N.YS.2d 926 (Sup. CL 1970).
269. In 1969 New York's legislature amended the section of the Education Law dealing
with suspension by adding to the grounds for suspension "conduct [which] otherwise endangers the safety, morals, health or welfare of others." Law of May 22, 1969, ch. 784,
[1969] N.Y. Laws 192d Sess. 2018. The statute had also been amended to restrict the power
of suspension to five days, unless a hearing with notice, the right to present witnesses, and
the right to counsel are afforded. Law of April 27, 1969, ch. 307, [1969] N.Y. Laws 192d
Sess. 1053.
270. In 1971 New York's legislature again amended the Education Law. Law of July 6,
1971, ch. 1149, [1971] N.Y. Laws 194th Sess. 0000 (codified at N.Y. Educ. Law § 3214(6) (c)

(McKinney Supp. 1971)). See also Law of July 2, 1971, ch. 1101, (1971] N.Y. Laws 194th
Sess. 0000, amending N.Y. Educ. Law § 3028(a) (McKinney 1970) (extension of civil
immunity to teachers informing school officials or parents of pupils' suspected addiction).
271. Although the common law and statutory basis for privacy of an individual's school
records has been sparse in New York, school officials have frequently been alert to the
implication of informational requests, and a few decisions have vaguely outlined a right.
See, e.g., In re Thibadeau, 1 N.Y. Educ. Dep't Rep. 607 (1960) (parent's access to records
sustained).
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persons outside the school system suggests a host of knotty questions for
which the school administrator can find little guidance. He must be cautious of giving anything beyond purely public records or data, and tread
cautiously or not at all in the area of statements to police without parental consent.272 It is suggested that this is a field which could well use
administrative guidelines from the state departmental authorities. If fear
hampers the response of school officials-and clearly it may seriously do
so at present-then effective help in combating the drug problem may
be greatly hampered.
Of course, when the crime occurs on the school grounds, school officials
will not be able to take the route of least resistance, i.e., of avoiding involvment.2 7 3 But the problems are at least as substantial and more clearly

immediate than when the crime occurs elsewhere. The confusion of being
complainant, witness, investigator and, in effect, peace officer, complicates
the role of the administrator whose expertise is in education, not law.
Since even lawyers often admit to ignorance in this area, it is easy to
sympathize with embattled officialdom facing a series of immediate demands requiring instant responses carrying significant legal implications.
Often they have little more than their own native intelligence to rely on
for guidance.
Previously, the actions of teachers and principals were justified by the
theory of in loco parentis. Recently, however, this catch-all phrase
has been subjected to judicial scrutiny, and it may be doubted whether
its reiteration, without more, will aid the school authorities. "More" is
the new burden of justification that must be shown by school authorities
in areas deemed within the constitutional ambit. The rationale is that the
limited hours and place of school activity necessitate restrictions on the
operation of rules which affect conduct outside of those limits. Thus, Judge
Kerner, speaking for the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in
Breen, observed that the parents' right to determine the appearance of
their children outside of school is restricted by grooming rules.274 While
conceptually differing from Tinker's emphasis on the right of the child,
Judge Kerner's view is in accord with the temporal and spacial limitations
placed on the operation and effect of school regulations found in other
opinions.
272. Guidelines are found in Opinion of Counsel, No. 148, 4 N.Y. Educ. Dep't Rep. 229
(1965): "The school particularly does not have custody of pupils for the purpose of authorizing law enforcement officers or other third parties to interrogate pupils or to remove them
from the premises for any purpose whatever. The rights of the parent in all such matters
are paramount and may not be assumed by the school." The school, however, is given instructions to cooperate with law enforcement officers, to honor warrants for arrest and court
orders for production, and is told of the need to make students available where a crime has
been committed on school grounds. Id.
273. See text accompanying notes 286-92 infra.
274. 419 F.2d at 1037-38.
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Notwithstanding the foregoing remarks, any report of the demise of
the principle of in loco parentis would be an exaggeration. It has shown
great vigor in the New York case of People v. Jackson,-75 where a pupil
was arrested off school grounds for possession of narcotics paraphernalia.
The high school coordinator received information concerning the student,
leading him to ask the boy to his office. When the coordinator noticed a
bulge in the defendant's pocket, the defendant ran off school grounds with
the coordinator in hot pursuit. A policeman near the office assisted in the
chase when the school official shouted: "'He's got junk and he's escaping.' ,1276 Three blocks away the two men caught the student. The coordinator grabbed the boy's hand from his pocket, allegedly causing drug
"works" to be extracted. The criminal court suppressed the evidence as
seized "without probable cause" in violation of the fourth amendment's
provision regarding unreasonable searches. A divided appellate court
reversed, holding that the school official stood "in loco parentis to the
children entrusted to his care .... ,,1277
Writing for the court, Justice Lupiano said that the school's obligation
to protect students in its charge encompassed both the pupil suspected,
who may harm himself, and others. He also stated that this quasi-parental
obligation precluded the operation of the fourth amendment, since the
coordinator acted "in loco parentis."278 Justice Markowitz made only
the briefest reference to the philosophy of loco parentis in his dissenting
opinion. 7 9 In fact, the dissent merely noted that the distance of three
blocks was too far to arrest "on suspicion alone." - The dissent's emphasis was on the question of illegal search and seizure. The majority,
on the other hand, assumed the coordinator acted as a private citizen,"
i.e., a parent, whereas the minority claimed that he acted "as an agent of
the city government cloaked with police powers and participating in the
governmental function .... "20 Certainly if the coordinator was acting
pursuant to the "affirmative obligation of the school authorities to investigate, ' 2 it would seem hard to divorce the coordinator's duties for purposes of the arrest.
Does loco parentis really explain anything here? It is doubtful that a
275. 65 Misc. 2d 909, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731 (App. T. 1971).
276. Id. at 910, 319 N.YS.2d at 732.
277. Id., 319 N.Y.S.2d at 733.
278. Id. at 914, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
279. Id. at 915, 319 N.Y..2d at 738.
280. Id., 319 N.YS.2d at 737.
281. See People v. Stewart, 63 Misc. 2d 601, 313 N.Y.S.2d 253 (Crim. Ct. 1970) (dean
acted as private person in seizing evidence).
282. 65 Misc. 2d at 915, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 737.
283. People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360, 363, 229 N.E.2d 596, 597-98, 283 N.YS.2d 22,
24 (1967), remanded, 393 U.S. 85 (1968), on remand, 24 N.Y.2d 522, 249 N.E.2d 366,
301 N.YS.2d 479 (1969).
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parent would have performed the action leading to the child's arrest. 284
It is true that the doctrine need not necessarily be read as a mandate
to the authorities to act as the parent would. But, if the purpose of the
doctrine is "preservation of order and discipline, 28 5 one may ask whether
the powers derived from loco parentis extend to acts which are unlikely to
be committed by parents, and unnecessary for the immediate purpose of
order. The concept explains too much or too little.
A further complication for the parental theory is added by the decision
in Bumper v. North Carolina.s6 There, a sheriff appeared at the home of
defendant's grandmother and told the grandmother that he had a search
warrant. As a result, she consented to a search of the house during the
course of which a rifle was found. The sheriff did not have a warrant and
the state sought to uphold the search on the basis of the grandmother's
consent. The Supreme Court held that "there can be no consent under
such circumstances.

21 8 7

Justice Lupiano distinguished this in Jackson,

citing People v. Overton.28 Overton involved the search of a school locker
consented to by the school principal after detectives showed him what later
284. See Opinion of Counsel, No. 148, 4 N.Y. Educ. Dep't Rep. 229 (1965) (principals
advised to inform parents of both their paramount right and the right to obtain counsel).
In the course of this article frequent reference has been made to opinions of the Commissioner of Education. These are important because the bulk of school litigation, at least in
New York, is probably resolved in administrative proceedings within the Department of
Education rather than by resort to the courts. The legislature has traditionally given wide
powers to the Commissioner, together with broad discretion and jurisdiction. Apparently
this is based on the assumption that education was best not subjected to normal local governmental authorities, nor to the regular court system. The result is a fairly simple "appellate"
procedure, which is both easier and quicker than the normal judicial channels and has
exhibited considerable care and awareness of constitutional rights. The facility with which
appeals may be instituted, together with the attention paid to individual rights, provides a
realistic remedy for aggrieved pupils and their parents. The courts may, and do frequently
insist upon the exhaustion of this remedy as a condition to using the judicial forum. Jackson v. Hepinstall, 328 F. Supp. 1104, 1107-08 (N.D.N.Y. 1971).
285. 79 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts § 493 (1952). Query as to the extent to which
the section is still valid? E.g., the remark that the "powers of the teacher in this respect are
unaffected . . . by the fact that his pupils, or any of them, are over twenty-one years of
age . . . ." Id. (footnotes omitted). Cf. People v. Cohen, 57 Misc. 2d 366, 292 N.Y.S.2d 706
(Nassau Dist. Ct. 1968). See also Axtell v. LaPenna, 323 F. Supp. 1077 (W.D. Pa. 1971):
"It is clear that the 'in loco parentis' section of the Pennsylvania School Code ... was never
intended to invest the schools with all the authority of parents over their minor children
but only such control as is necessary to prevent infractions of discipline and interference
with the educational process." Id. at 1080 (citation omitted).
286. 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
287. Id. at 548.
288. 20 N.Y.2d 360, 229 N.E.2d 596, 283 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967). The Supreme Court
remanded the case in light of Bumper. Overton v. New York, 393 U.S. 85 (1968). On rehearing the New York Court of Appeals affirmed its original decision. 24 N.Y.2d 522, 249

N.E.2d 366, 301 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1969). This decision was sustained on an application to the
federal court. 311 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). For an analysis of the Overton decision, see
38 Fordham L. Rev. 344 (1969).
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proved to be an invalid warrant. Upon a motion to suppress the evidence
(marijuana cigarettes), the trial court held that the school principal had
a right to consent to the locker search. The appellate term reversed on
the ground that the consent could not validate an otherwise illegal search,
and the court of appeals again reversed with Chief Judge Fuld and Judge
Bergan dissenting. The basis of the majority's holding was the obligation
of the school authority to search plus its control over school lockers. However, it should be noted that the court said that when the principal
"learned of the detectives' suspicion, he was obligated to inspect the
locker." 289 The case went to the Supreme Court which remanded it.'
When it was again scrutinized by the New York Court of Appeals, Judge
Burke, speaking for the majority, distinguished Bumper as a case involving coercion, and held that this was not present in the locker search
involved in Overton. Thus, the court of appeals relied heavily on the
school's responsibility for its physical facilities,2 91 and the principal's
obligation as a school official, as well as the fact that no student was physically involved. 29 2 The narrow margin separating the majority and minority
does not make the decision a certain one for future guidance. However, it
it noteworthy that the basis for the decision is pragmatic, emphasizing
jurisdiction over physical facilities. The specificity of this analysis has
much to recommend it as against the vague loco parentis.
The Supreme Court in Gault said that the concept of loco parentis
originally appeared to extend to children only until seven years of age,
following which time they were treated as if they were adults. 0- 3 The
purpose, according to Mr. Justice Fortas, was to protect "property interests" in the child. The apparently equivalent phrase of parens palriae2'
assumed the child had no rights. Nevertheless, in time it came to be
289. 20 N.Y.2d at 363, 229 N.E.2d at 598, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
290.

Overton v. New York, 393 U.S. 85 (1968).

291. "As the designated representative of people of Mount Vernon, Dr. Panitz [the school
principal] opened the locker, which was certainly not the private property of the defendant,
in fulfillment of the trust and responsibility given him by the city residents through the
Board of Education." 24 N.Y.2d at 526, 249 N.E.2d at 368, 301 N.YS.2d at 482.
292. However, it should be observed that the coercion in Bumper was directed at the
grandmother and, by analogy, would be directed here, if present, to the principal. We speak
of the coercion above in terms of the pupil, because of the court's emphasis on the fact
that the search was of a locker, and not involving a person. Inferentially the majority on
the second review by the court of appeals felt that the principal's knowledge was sufficient
ground for the search. Accord, Moore v. Student Affairs Comm., 284 F. Supp. 72S (M.D.
Ala. 1968) (college dormitory search based on "reasonable" information). Contra, People
v. Cohen, 57 Misc. 2d 366, 292 N.YS.2d 706 (Nassau, Dist. Ct. 1968), where a college dormitory room was held to have status equal to off campus rooms. In Pizzola v. Watkins, 316
F. Supp. 624 (M.D. Ala. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971), a college dormitory
search for drugs was held illegal where the information on which the warrant was based was
deemed insufficient
293. 387 U.S. at 16-17.
294. Id. at 16.
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utilized to cover the state's action of denying rights in an effort to protect
the minor.295 The Supreme Court explicitly rejected such a curtailment
of rights under the guise of parental interest in Kent v. United States29
and implied that the state's obligations under parens patriae are, if anything, greater than indicated in most expressions of loco parentisbecause
of its function of "guidance and rehabilitation.1 2 7 The "'parental' relationship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness. ' 298 In the cases
where loco parentis is used, the thrust seems to be to justify some act
in a criminally related proceeding, rather than the actual maintenance of
peace or discipline in school. It is precisely in these areas that the Supreme
Court has drastically limited the applicability of loco parentis.
IV. AREAS OF EVOLVING RELATIONS: THOUGHTS ON
ADJUSTMENT AND ASSERTION OF RIGHTS

There is a pervasive quality about the present state statutory schemes
for compulsory education. The current comprehensive school attendance
laws indicate that every child shall attend school for ten months each
year. In New York a minor may attend public school from the age of
five years 90 to the age of twenty-one years, 00 but must attend from six
to sixteen years of age.30 1 The attendance requirements are closely
related to the possibility or permissibility of employment, and appear, at
least secondarily, to have been designed with an intention to restrict child
labor.80 2 The supervision of the minor's life continues until age eighteen
through work certificates, although exceptions are provided for those
whose education continues.30 3 These laws were sustained as an appropriate
exercise of police powera° at a time when the Supreme Court took a dim
view of legislation showing solicitude for other classes of workers. Thus,
a limitation of a baker's workday to 10 hours was held to be an unconstitutional infringement of freedom of contract for "men, sui juris,"' ' 5
295.

Id. at 17-18.

296.

383 U.S. 541, 554-56 (1966).

297.

Id. at 554.

298. Id. at 555.
299. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3202(1) (McKinney 1970). Public nursery school attendance is
permitted at 3 years of age. Id. § 1712(2).
300. Id. § 3202(1) ; cf. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 80-1501 (1960) (6 years to 21 years permitted).
301. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3205 (McKinney 1970); cf. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 80-1502 (1960) (7
years to 15 years required).
302. See N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 3205, 3215-30 (McKinney 1970).
303. Id. § 3215(4)(f).
304. City of New York v. Chelsea Jute Mills, 43 Misc. 266, 88 N.Y.S. 1085 (Mun. Ct.
1904). While not ruled upon by the New York Court of Appeals, this case was relied upon
to uphold child labor laws in other states. See, e.g., Kowalczyk v. Swift & Co., 329 I1. 308,
160 N.E. 588 (1928) ; Inland Steel Co. v. Yedinak, 172 Ind. 423, 87 N.E. 229 (1909) ; Casteel
v. Pittsburgh Vitrified Paving & Bldg. Brick Co., 83 Kan. 533, 112 P. 144 (1910); Bryant v.
Skillman Hardware Co., 76 N.J.L. 45, 69 A. 23 (1908).
305. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905). Children are not considered sul Jur
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and women were protected against legislation designed to protect them 0°
Quaere: Will the Supreme Court reconsider the legislation designed to
protect children, a significant part of which are the compulsory attendance
laws? As indicated above," 7 there is nothing in Tinker or its case law
progeny to suggest that the Court was inclined to modify the universal
state mandates of compulsory education, but the acceptance of lower
maturity levels could move us in that direction. Although most legislation
appears to have settled on the eighteen-year-old level as the period to
commence rights and responsibilities, and it has more recently gained
constitutional status, 308 pressures for further modification are not impossible.
There are important practical considerations which lead one to wonder
whether compulsion to attend school is a good answer where interest is
lacking and training is irrelevant. Whether the present laws blanketing
children's lives through eighteen years of age is the wisest method of
preparing them for life is at least questionable. The rigidity of the structure has resulted in a substantial number of children who are uninterested
in the courses they take, and disaffected from those who offer the education. The answers to these problems do not lie in the legal system. However, to the extent that answers are developed, they will have to ultimately
be expressed in terms of law. Both judicial and legislative attention to the
problems of the fifteen to eighteen-year-old group may be a significant
activity in the next few years.
A starting point in drafting rules for the conduct of pupils, at least
in the upper grades, might be to involve the pupils in the process of
formulating the regulations, as some systems have done. This should be
an educational undertaking. It ought to furnish a practical demonstration to the student that he not only has rights, but obligations. In the
past, the legal theory has been that the board of education had authority
over the rules, but in practice it was left to administrators. The assumption was that discipline was a one-way street. Even modern texts do not
trouble to talk of pupil's rights; the only question seems to be how far
school authority over pupils extends. Under these circumstances it is not
surprising that there has been little discussion of a pupil's legal rights,
and virtually no instruction in the subject. Taken simply as an educational topic, one is led to wonder how effective social studies courses
can be when they ignore matters of present interest to pupils and discuss
only civil rights in the future, or those rights enjoyed by other people.
It is understandable that pupils are not well informed of their rights,
until twelve years of age. See Gloshinsky v. Bergen Milk Transp. Co., 279 N.Y. 54, 17 N.E2d
766 (1938); Meyer v. Inguaggiato, 258 App. Div. 331, 16 N.YS.2d 672 (2d Dep't 1940).
306. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
307. See text accompanying note 240 supra.
308. U.S. Const. amend. XXVI.
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and that they are not informed as to how they may go about enforcing
them. It is equally understandable that those in authority are somewhat
apprehensive about educating in this area; perhaps thereby encouraging
pupils to assert their rights. The danger of such knowledge is not chimerical, but it ought, in a very practical sense, to be weighed against the
danger of ignorance-the item that schools seek to overcome. The ignorant student today is not totally unaware that he has some type of rights.
He may consult an attorney to rectify a grievance but more likely he will,
if sufficiently disturbed, engage in disruptive or destructive activities,
possibly in concert with others. Surely there is a better answer to student
complaints than suggesting that only non-learning, force or repression
are the appropriate responses of a school system. It is submitted that
only by education in civil rights, including those affecting the pupil in the
school environment, can the youth of today appreciate the concomitant
responsibilities. Only by such education can the student be expected to
respond in terms of the laws which govern us all. If one does not know
the rules it can hardly be expected that he will operate within the system.
Hopefully a responsive system would provide not only a set of rules
which represents the thinking of all affected, but the mechanism for modification. Equally important, the school must furnish some means which
permits the aggrieved pupil to obtain someone's attention to discuss his
problem. The school should go further and provide some quasi-judicial
structure to process a claim where a pupil feels his rights have been
denied. Without this the pupil is likely to feel-and probably with good
cause-that the enforcement procedure is a sham designed chiefly to
mollify rather than protect pupils. Without active participation of pupils
in review of serious claims, it is doubtful whether the structure, however
elaborate and well intended, can enlist student support. This is the objective. For unless the student can expect a fair shake, we cannot expect him
to petition the school officials to redress a particular grievance. The
sophisticated student will seek legal aid; the others may follow less social
patterns. In either case, the school officials will no longer be dealing
directly with the pupil. They will be expending time, money and energy
in formalized disputes which might have been more advantageously attended to within the school.
Today there are few school systems that provide formal redress or
grievance procedures for pupils. There have been some attempts to replace
the archaic approaches to student government. There has been a recent
experience of ad hoc committees with lists of "nonnegotiable demands"
which seem now to be passing into history. Possibly these were indicative
of a vacuum where new forms had not emerged, and the old had expired.
Irrespective of structure, we may presume that all systems provide informal approaches of varying responsiveness. But the events of the last
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few years indicate that the older modes are inadequate. The answer should
not be either an armed camp, nor a "rush ... to the .
courts with
constitutional banners waving high."3 0 9 Nor can we trust to luck, unless
we wish to repeat the disruption and sporadic violence of the last few
years. Providing redress for grievances is a part of the student's education,
and hopefully it will provide a readily available forum to resolve disputes
without a denial of basic rights.
Obviously, new modes of activity and behavior are emerging. Not all
of the changes will be of a strictly legal or constitutional nature. Administrative and educational practices may alter significantly without directly
touching the legal strucfure. Thus, some school systems now invite students to participate in the evaluation and hiring of staff members. The
accomodation will continue whether it be by thoughtful guidance and
mutual development, or by default of planning. It seems reasonable to
expect that the best results will be achieved by those who devote time
and study to outline the rules of conduct that are to guide them, and who
then proceed to exchange their ideas in an effort to achieve a mutually
acceptable set of ground rules. Presumably these rules will reflect the
current state of the law, but it is to be hoped that the school community
will not be content to rely solely on judicial statements.
Legal concepts are often rough rules of thumb designed in an indirect
way to safeguard a right. The procedures employed may achieve their
result in the technical court setting, but they do not necessarily translate
easily or well to serve as modes of conduct in another setting. The judicial
holdings and rules, of course, form the framework or point of reference
by which we measure our regulations and by laws. But the most meaningful rules will be those developed in the school systems rather than those
evolved from occasional judicial opinions which touch only briefly on
small surfaces of the broad picture. The slow accretion of case law has
the virtue of allowing theories to be tested by time, and of permitting
adaptation of rules which otherwise might become obsolete. But the courts
have only an indirect and tangential experience with the substantive
matter. In the emotion-laden setting of trial by ordeal, the result may
vary not only according to the court's point of view in general, but the
point from which it views the particular problem. It is curious how different "academic freedom" or "civil rights" may be seen, depending on
whether the dispute is between teacher and administration, pupil and
teacher, or pupil and administration. 310 It is not simply a question of
"whose ox is gored." Rather it is an area in which there appears to be an
unusual number of combinations of interest with surprising mutations;
309. Farrell v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 1971).
310. And that is before we add others who may be involved, i.e., parents, board of education, non-school officialdom and non-parent citizens.
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where the interested parties may unexpectedly find their old problems in
a new context. The changes can produce disorientation which in itself
evokes emotional responses that are often effective deterrents to reasoned
solutions. If the judges are in such cases likely to be more dispassionate
in assessing such situations after they have arisen, the inhabitants of the
schools should be more competent in analyzing the problems based on
the background, knowledge, experience, and, we trust, their perception.
The school systems themselves should produce the most significant regulations to guide their own conduct.
The Supreme Court has, during the past decade, emphasized the "inestimable right of personal security." 31' This right is accorded to students,
among others. Obviously this right means that all students are to be protected, and that one cannot be allowed to endanger the others with violence
or crime. The problem is similar for all congregations of human beings,
where the actions of some, well-intended as well as improper, may interfere with the actions of others. To achieve the optimum of freedom always
means an accommodation and an adjustment. The school setting adds the
additional difficulties of younger years and compulsory presence. But
the new note that has been sounded is that the reins have been drawn
tighter on the school authorities, including administrators and teachers,
boards of education and custodians. Undoubtedly there will be disadvantages to the learning process along with the benefits. There is usually a
cost for constitutional rights. 3 '
Among the considerations for new directions should be the extent to
which schools should proceed in physically maintaining discipline. Should
teachers administer physical punishment? Few today maintain that they
should. Less clear, however, is the teacher's role as a proctor or guard.
If there is disobedience, is it better for the educational staff to handle
such matters, or might it be preferable to divorce the duties? Is it possible
or practicable to do so? How many teachers can administer physical discipline to youths of fourteen years or over? The answers to these questions
require thought and discussion by the participants in the school systems,
legislators, and the general public. The questions do not arise simply because the Supreme Court said public school children have constitutional
rights. The "youth revolution" is a feature of today's society, as are urban
problems, racial conflicts and a host of other difficulties, all of which affect
the school system. What the judicial opinions of the past couple of years
have made plain is that authoritarian rote answers are not legally sufficient. It seems clear that authoritarian rote measures would not be
"answers" practically. The answers must come from the educational
system.
311.
312.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968).
Id. at 14-1.

